史迪威日记（节选）
回到目录页作者：史迪威
录入校对：观棋不语
本文节选日记中与第五军、新二二师相关的段落
本书的内容和编排体例是：
- 每章开始或每章中间以楷体字呈现的是抗战期间美国驻中国战地记者白修德所写的背景介绍。（校对语：在整合版中以中英文斜体出现）
- 史迪威的日记和他的评论性文字，以及他与史迪威夫人的通信。
- 由编译者所加的人物、事件简介，在相对应的正文中以卡片的形式呈现。
- 本书在初版时，由白修德担任编辑者，并由他撰写了背景介绍和前言，本书正文中的脚注也出自白修德之手。
- 本书正文中（）中的内容为史迪威日记、评论、书信中原有；[]中的内容为编译者所加。
1942年
3月10日
Talk with Chiang K’ai-shek. Lecture about Chinese temperament and limitations. Why they can’t attack. What they will do. Won’t retreat until ordered out, etc., etc. But defeat in Burma would be disastrous shock to morale. Fifth and Sixth [are] “cream of Army.” Must be careful, etc., etc. I put up a stout plea to use the British as far as possible, and not expose Chiang K’ai-shek to criticism by reneging on his commitments. He had a lot of good sense in his talk. Importance of making good-first foreigner to handle Chinese troops. Impression made on these troops will make or break me. Must look to future. I repeated instructions and went over all the points he had made. Look at it coldly, and the Chinese are doing a big thing from their point of view in handing over this force to a lao mao-tzu [old hat] they don’t know very well. It must be a wrench for them, and they should be given due credit, in spite of all the restrictions they have put on me. 22nd and 96th Divisions (of Fifth Army) edge in when chow is provided. Sixth Army stays put. Hold Toungoo- Prome line till British leave Prone. Then back to T’hazi line. Hold at Thazi and concentrate for counterattack.
同蒋介石谈话。蒋大谈中国人的气质和他们所受到的约束；他们不能进攻的理由；他们想要做什么；除非接到撤出的命令，否则他们不会这样做，等等，等等。但是在缅甸的失败对于士气将是灾难性的一击。第五军和第六军是“军队中的精华”。必须慎重，等等，等等。我态度异常坚决地请求尽可能地利用英国人。他在谈话中判断敏锐。他知道这次行动的成败事关重大——一个外国人第一次指挥中国军队。给这些军队留下的印象将使我或是成功，或是毁灭。必须面向未来。我把他说的要点都重复了一遍。用客观的观点来看这件事，中国人把军队交给一个他们并不十分熟悉的外国人，是做了一件了不起的大事。这对他们来说肯定是十分痛苦的，尽管他们对我进行种种限制，但他们应当得到本应得到的称赞。
得到食品供应后，（第五军的）第22师和第96师缓慢地开了进去。第六军留在原地未动。在英国人离开眉谬之前要一直据守东吁一眉谬一线。然后回到达西一线。守住达西，集结力量准备反攻。
When Stilwell arrived in Burma to assume combat duties in March he found a country whose civil population, both rear and front, festered with discontent and treachery. The strategy of the entire Burma campaign spun itself about the north-south railway line that ran three hundred miles from Rangoon to Mandalay, and then in meter gauge, two hundred fifty miles more to Myitkyina. Some- where in central Burma the Allies hoped to establish a front cutting from east to west across the railway, where the Japanese might be held. Meanwhile the actual line of combat was some hundred miles north of Rangoon, running east and west for roughly one hundred miles. This front was being pushed north by the Japanese, but the Allies were trying to shield the railway as they withdrew to keep retreat from degenerating into a rout over pathless mountains and jungles. The western end of the front (nearest India) was held by the British at Prome. The center, at Toungoo directly on the railway, was held by the Chinese 200th Division, the eastern end (nearest Thailand) was held by the British again. The forces at Stilwell’s command consisted of the following:
- Chinese Fifth Army (Commander: Tu Yü-ming) which in turn commanded the 200th Division(Tai), 22nd Division (Liao), goth Division (Yu), and the 38th Division(Sun)
- Chinese Sixth Army (Commander: Kan Li-ch’u) which in turn commanded the 55th Division(Chen), 28th Division (?) and the 49th Division (?)
The 200th Division was in the line. The rest of the Fifth Army was in north Burma several hundred miles to the rear. The Sixth Army was disposed along the border of China and Thailand. The Japanese in their swift drive north had almost encircled the 200th division (Chinese) at Toungoo in the center. But in so doing they had also exposed themselves, and Stilwell saw an opportunity for a counterattack. As commander in chief of the Burma Expeditionary Forces of the Chinese Armies he wanted to concentrate his forces at Pyinmana on the railway 60 miles north of the front. He wanted particularly to bring down the 22nd and g6th Divisions of General Tu Yü-ming’s Fifth Army from the north, where they were useless, to the Pyinmana area, where they could rescue the 200th Division. Scattered across Burma, the Chinese divisions would be destroyed one by one-concentrated and used in battle, they might check the Japanese advance. It might even be possible to recapture Rangoon and reopen the port. The plan depended on two things: the ability of the British to hold the western flank at Prome and the swiftness and diligence of the Chinese in moving to execute orders for a counterattack. To the Chinese, however, concentration of divisions in the battle zone for a counterattack meant not a multiplication of opportunity, but a multiplication of risk of loss. Reluctance to attack seemed to drench the spirit of the Chinese command beyond any measure of encouragement Stilwell could give. In the course of the next two weeks Stilwell found that his authority to command was an authority of courtesy, not an authority of action. He decided then to fly back to Chungking and discuss the matter with Chiang K’ai- shek.
白修德注：
3月，当史迪威到达缅甸，承担起指挥作战的职责时，他发现这个国家无论是在后方还是前方，由于普通老百姓的不满和背叛，状况变得越来越糟。 整个缅甸战役是围绕着贯穿缅甸南北的铁路线进行的。这条铁路线从仰光至曼德勒，有300英里长，此后是1米的窄轨，再走250英里到达密支那。盟军希望在缅甸中部的某个地方建立一条战线，从东向西横跨铁路线摆开，以此阻止住日军。当时实际的战线在仰光以北大约100英里处，从东到西宽约100英里。这条战线正在被日军推向北面，但盟军在撤退时力图保住铁路，以免在撤退时穿越无路可走的山地和丛林。 战线的西端（离印度最近的地方）由驻眉谬的英军据守。战线中部的东吁在铁路线上，由中国的第200师扼守，东端（离泰国最近的地方）也是由英军防守。 归史迪威指挥的部队如下：
- 中国的第五军（指挥官：杜聿明），该军下辖第200师（戴）、第22师（廖）、第96师（余）和第38师（孙）。
- 中国的第六军（指挥官：甘丽初），该军下辖第55师（陈）、第28师（？）和第49师（？）。
第200师正在前线，第五军的其余部队在缅甸北部，距后方几百英里。第六军被部署在中国和泰国的边境线上。 日本人迅速地向北推进，几乎包围了战线中部东吁的第200师。但日本人在向前推进时也暴露了他们自己，史迪威看到了一个反攻的机会。作为中国缅甸远征军总司令，他要求把部队在战线以北60英里铁路线上的彬马那集结起来。他特别要求杜聿明将军的第22师和第96师从北部挥师南下，开到彬马那地区，去解救第200师。中国的各个师如果分散在缅句各地，就会被各个击破；但如果他们集结起来投入战斗，就有可能阻挡住日本人的进攻，甚至可能重新夺取仰光。 这个计划有赖于两点：英国人在眉谬能够守住战线的西翼，中国人能够迅速完全地执行反攻命令。 然而，对于中国人来说，把各个师集结在作战地区进行反攻在增加了机会的同时也增加了危险。看来，无论史迪威用什么方法加以鼓励，中国的指挥机构也不愿意去进攻。在以后的两周里，史迪威发现，他的指挥权只是表面的权力，而不是实际上的权力。于是他决定飞回重庆，去同蒋介石讨论这个问题。
3月13日
Friday the 13th. Alexander arrived. Very cautious. Long sharp nose. Rather brusque and yang ch’i [standoffish]. Let me stand around while waiting for Shang Chen to come. Uninterested when Shang did come. Astonished to find ME-mere me, a goddam American-in command of Chinese troops. “Extraordinary!” Looked me over as if I had just crawled out from under a rock.
2: 00 p.m. Brigadier Clark and Colonel Jones about maintenance. They agreed to do it. Also will repair ordnance and operating instruments. Damn nice of them. In fact, all the British are now co-operating. If Chiang K’ai-shek will only say “Go” we’re off. The press is after me now. Dorn is keeping them off.
About midnight, Major Miller, from the governor’s office, barged into my bedroom, woke me up and said General Morris was in from India, and that he and General Alexander wanted to see me at 10: 00 in the morning at “Flagstaff House.” Can you beat it? I wonder what those babies would have said if I had sent Dorn on a similar errand to them? It’s just the superior race complex, for which they will pay dearly. The situation down front looked bad, so I radioed Chiang K’ai-shek over Hou’s secret set, to release the 22nd and g6th Divisions to go to Pyinmana and back up the 200th.
13日，星期五。亚历山大¹ 抵达。既谨小慎微，又极其鲁莽、冷漠。在等待商震的时候居然让我一个人站在那里。在商震来时无动于衷。商震惊奇地发现居然是我在指挥中国军队，一个该死的美国人。“妙极了！”他上下打量着我，好像我是刚刚从石头下面爬出来似的。
下午2点钟，与克拉克准将[时任美国陆军地面部队司令部代参谋长]和琼斯上校讨论军械保养问题。他们同意去做修理军械和操作设备的事情。这些东西的情况糟透了。事实上，现在所有的中国人都很合作。只要蒋介石说一声“走”，我们就完事大吉了。现在新闻界已经盯上我了。多恩正在设法让我避开他们。
大约在午夜时分，总督办公处的米勒少校闯进我的卧室，把我叫醒，说莫里斯将军已从印度来到这里，他和亚历山大将军想在上午10点钟同我在旗杆别墅见面。我想知道如果我派多恩到他们那里去干同样的事情，他们会说些什么？这完全是一种高人一等的变态心理，他们将为此付出高昂的代价。
前线的情况看来不妙，于是我通过侯的秘密电台给蒋介石拍了封电报，要求他允许22师和96师去彬马那增援200师。
¹ 哈罗德·亚历山大爵士，陆军元帅，后来成为地中海所有盟国部队的司令官。
3月15日（上午9点）
Morris, Hutton, Alexander, at Flagstaff House. Told them the news. They were much relieved. Alexander now pleasanter. (Morris has talked to him.) They had the instructions out studying them. Alexander tried to joke about my stealing his Chinese troops. [He] wanted to wear some Chinese insignia. Sent word to Wavell and Brereton…. Asked for air support.
Alex says he has just 4,000 fighting men. Alex says he now perfectly understands and we will co-operate alongside each other.
Move of 22nd and g6th Divisions under way. Leading elements here tomorrow. Tu came over at 5: 00. He had to shoot a man of the 55th Division at Lashio for hell-raising. I told him to keep it up. DC-3 crash at Kunming. General Dennys killed, on way to tell Chiang K’ai-shek to send more troops.
Got Tu over, went over plan, wrote order for Tu.
与莫里斯、赫顿和亚历山大在旗杆别墅。把这个消息告诉了他们。他们大大地松了一口气。亚历山大的举止现在令人轻松愉快。他们仔细地研究了那些命令。亚历山大想开个玩笑，说我偷走了他的中国军队。他想佩戴一些中国军队的标志。通知了韦维尔和布里尔顿··要求空中支援。
亚历山大说他仅有4000名战斗人员。并说他现在已完全释怀，我们将肩并肩地进行合作。
22师和96师已开始行动。先头部队将于明天到达这里。杜5点钟来访。他在腊戍枪毙了55师中一个胡作非为的人。我告诉他要保持振作。DC—3型飞机在昆明失事，丹尼斯将军遇难，他此行是想让蒋介石增派军队。
帮助杜恢复了常态，仔细检查了计划，写了给杜的命令。
3月19日
Had a night’s sleep-first time since Calcutta. Woke up without feeling all was lost. At 11:00 saw Chiang K’ai-shek again. Stubborn bugger. But he gave in a bit. 22nd Division can go to Taungdwingyi and can support 200th or help British out of a mess if they lose Prome. [See map, page 57.] Under my command only, and only in emergency. It’s to be morale mainly.
g6th Division must stay in Mandalay, but one division of Sixth Army will be sent to Maymyo. Later two more will go to border. In a month, if nothing happens, maybe we can take the offensive. (He wants to be sure it will be easy.) Again told me Fifth and Sixth must not be defeated, so I told him to send someone who could guarantee that, because I couldn’t. In war, we’d have to do our best and take what came. He laughed. Said he had bowed in some part to my recommendations, but insisted he knew what he was talking about. Told him when fighting started, I would have to be free to act, and he agreed. Of course under the general restrictions of defensive attitude, one division in Mandalay, no British command, and help for British only in an emergency. It’s pretty bad, but maybe it will get better. All I can do is try.
59 today. Very nice message from Marshall.
Q. Am I getting anywhere?
A. Compared to two weeks ago, decidedly. Appointment as Chief of Staff,(Creation of)Joint Staff, and Commanding General of Fifth and Sixth Armies. Of course there are many restrictions, but not so many as at first. Continued butting is wearing down resistance. Repeated arguments are shaking Madame somewhat. (In fact she told me to keep it up.) And Ho Ying-ch’in, Pai Chung-hsi, Liu Fei, and Hsü Yung-ch’ang unanimously approved my argument. That might be considered a major victory. Even Chiang K’ai-shek has yielded on some points-he is sending more troops, he has released a division to Taungdwingyi, and I can even use it to help the British at Prome. He will consider an offensive if there is quiet, or a successful defense-after another month. The supply is arranged, the medical people are stirred up, and the British understand how they must work. The Chinese accept my status, which is close to a miracle, since it is the first time in modern history that a foreigner has commanded regular Chinese troops.
睡了整整一夜——自加尔各答以来的第一次。醒来时已没有那种失掉了一切的感觉。11点再次去见蒋介石。固执的家伙。但他稍微让了点步。22师可以开到东敦枝，去支援200师；或是在英国人失去眉谬时帮助他们摆脱困境。只能由我来指挥，而且只有在处于十分紧急的情况下。
96师必须留驻曼德勒，但第六军的一个师将被派往眉谬。此后另外两个师将被派到边境地区。如果不发生意外，也许在一个月里我们就能发动攻势。（他要确保能轻而易举地完成它。）他再次对我说，决不能让第五军和第六军吃败仗。于是我对他说，让他另外找一个能保证这一点的人来，因为我无法保证做到这一点。在战争中，我们必须竭尽自己的努力去干，并接受现实结果。他笑了。他说他同意我建议中的某些部分，但仍坚持他所谈论的事情。我告诉他，一旦战斗打响，我必须有行动的自由，他同意了。当然，我还要受到进攻上的一些限制，一个师在曼德勒，不允许英国人来指挥，只有在紧急情况下才能去帮助英国人。这糟透了。但情况也许会好转。我所能做的就是去试一试。
今天59岁了。马歇尔那里传来了非常好的消息。
问题：我的工作有成效吗？
回答：与两周前相比，已取得了决定性进展。被任命为参谋长，第五军和第六军建立了联合参谋部，以我为指挥官。当然，还有许多限制，但已不像刚开始时那么多了。不断的争论已使对手慢慢败退下来。反复申诉自己的观点也使夫人的立场有了松动。（事实上，她还让我坚持下去。）何应钦、白崇禧、刘斐和徐永昌一致赞同我的观点。这应当被视为是一场重大胜利。甚至连蒋介石也在某些问题上做了让步——他将派遣更多的军队，他同意派一个师去东敦枝，我甚至可以用这个师来帮助在眉谬的英国人。如果再过一个月，防守取得成功，他将考虑进攻的问题。供给已安排好了，医务人员已发动起来，英国人必须知道他们应如何工作。中国人接受了我的地位，这几乎是个奇迹，一个外国人指挥中国的正规军，这在近代历史上还是第一次。
3月23日
Toungoo being attacked. Tu [of Fifth Army] worried. Talked it over. Will send 22nd Division to Pyinmana and Yedashe and prepare to counterattack to support 200th.
- 55th Division hurry to Pyawbwe.
- 22nd Division hurry to Pyinmana and south.
- Radio Chiang K’ai-shek that Tu wants help near-by and I agree.
Rushed back to Maymyo to get things going. Arrived 4: 30. No air support left now. Tai’s tanks on way [to front], 30 miles south of Mandalay at 2: 30. Bed at 12: 00.
东吁受到攻击。杜聿明感到担忧。详细讨论此事。决定派22师去彬马那和耶达谢，准备反攻，以支援200师。
- 55师迅速赶往标贝。
- 22师迅速赶往彬马那及其南部。
- 致电蒋介石，杜聿明要求就近给予支援，我赞同。
立即赶回眉谬。4点30分到达。现在已没有空中支援。戴的坦克正在开往前线，2点30分到达曼德勒以南30英里处。12点睡觉。
3月24日
200th Division hang on [at Toungoo] till 22nd Division gets set at Pyinmana [to support it]. [22nd] can’t be sent to Taungdwingyi now, no water there anyway. Push out a regiment south, and then tell 200th Division to break out and join at Pyinmana. Put 55th Division in at Pyawbwe and hang on at Pyinmana. (Use g6th and 38th Divisions similarly and delay back to Mandalay. This is the best we can hope for.) Wrote letters. Haircut. Nap. Japs north of Toungoo.
The suspense till the 22nd [Division] gets going is bad.
战局：200师在[东吁]坚守，等待22师在彬马那部署完毕。
现在不能把22师派往东敦枝，那里没有水。让一个团向南推进，然后通知200师突围，在彬马那会合。（用同样的方式使用96师和38师，推迟回曼德勒。这是我们所能想到的最好的方案。）写信。理发。午睡。日本人已到达东吁北部。
在22师取得进展之前，这种悬而未决的局面很不妙。
3月25日
Situation confused. Got it straight with Tu. He is quite cheerful with 22nd [Division] coming down. General Scott, 1st Burmese Division, in. Looking for 4 guns and 200 men. Caught in surprise at Toungoo airfield yesterday.
Nap. Scott back. Got his guns. Tu has report [Chinese] counterattack has reached point just north of [Toungoo] airfield.
9:00 p.m. to see Tu-he had scheme of attack ready for the 27th. Exactly like my solution. Whole of 22nd Division will attack from Kyundon south. (If the Japs will stay put tomorrow.) Chiang K’ai-shek has changed his mind. Three [radio] letters on the 23rd. 3:00 p.m., 5:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. Full of all kinds of warnings, admonition, and caution. Then, at last, at 9: 00 p.m., he said, “Use your judgment and give ‘em hell.” Apparently the fight here has pepped him up. [He says] we can use the 22nd. (Which I had already ordered in.) And I told Tu to take the o6th and bring it along also. The 55th is already turned over to Tu. Whoops. WHAT A RELIEF.
Chiang K’ai-shek and his changeable mind had me worried. I was deadly afraid he would call off this attack. But the seed has apparently taken root, and as Tu says, now we can work my plan. Christ. The mental load on a commander who has strings tied to him. Now Chiang K’ai-shek is concerned about pursuit before we even stop the Japs. If I had done what he wanted and put the 22nd in Taungdwingyi, the 200th would have been Iost and God knows what might have happened. It may still be bad, but it couldn’t be that bad. Three newspaper boys [in for interviews.]
局势混乱。同杜聿明一同处理问题。他对22师的到来感到十分鼓舞。斯科特将军和缅甸第一师也来了。等待4门大炮和200名军人。昨天在东吁机场意外地相遇。
午睡。斯科特回来了。他找到了他的大炮。杜得到报告说反攻部队已到达机场北面。
晚上9点去见杜，他制订了27日进攻的计划。同我的方案极相似。整个22师将从均栋南部发动进攻。（如果日本人明天仍留在原地的话。）蒋介石改变了主意。他于23日午后3点、5点和9点接连发来3封电报。电报中充满了各种警告、劝说和告诫。他在晚上9点钟的那封电报中说，“运用你的判断力，让他们灵魂出窍。”显然，这里的战斗使他激动不已。[蒋介石说]我们可以动用22师（其实，我在这之前已经动用此师投入了战斗）。我让杜聿明去接管96师，把它也带过来。55师已被杜接管。啊，这多么令人欣慰！
令我感到担忧的是蒋介石和他的反复无常。我十分担心他会取消这次进攻。但是种子已经扎下了根，正如杜聿明所说的那样，我们现在可以实施我的计划了。天哪。一个受他操纵的指挥官要承受着多么巨大的精神负担啊。甚至在我们还没有阻挡住日本人的时候，蒋介石就已经在关心追击的事情了。如果我按照他的设想去做，把22师部署在东敦枝，200师就会被毁灭，只有上帝知道会发生什么事情。现在的情况可能还是不妙，但不会比那样做更糟糕。
未标注时间
[This undated paper, found in General Stilwell’s files, was probably written shortly after the close of the first Burma campaign.]
[下面这份未注明日期的文件是在史迪威将军的档案里发现的，也许是在第一次缅甸战役结束不久后写的。]
When Chiang K’ai-shek told me I was to take command of the Chinese Army in Burma I found that he expected to give me the benefit of his advice and experiences. At the time, the 200th Division was at Toungoo, and the 22nd going into Mandalay and the g6th near Lashio.
He asked me what my plan was and I told him I wanted to concentrate the three divisions near Toungoo. This was not the approved solution: Mandalay, he insisted, was the key to the situation, and he preferred to put both the 22nd and the g6th there, so as to have a strong garrison. We were told to hold Mandalay at all costs. I told him that this would mean that the 200th Division would be beaten and the Japs could then march to Mandalay unopposed. I wanted to fight as far forward as possible, after concentrating all available force there. If we could get three divisions concentrated, we would have some chance of holding the Japs, whereas leaving the 200th Division unsupported would mean losing it and having to oppose the Japs later with only the other two. No, that was not the way it would work. He would give me an instance in his own experience. He had just such a case at Chengchow, which the Japs were approaching from the east. There were three divisions available, but he was too crafty to put them all out there at once. He put one of then in Chengchow, with orders to defend to the last, and drew the other two back to the west about 5o miles. The Japs attacked and destroyed the division in Chengchow. But they went no farther. And do you know why? This, he announced, was a matter of psychology-the Japs were so impressed with the determined defense put up by one division that they simply did not have the heart to go and attack the other two. So really he had stopped the Jap attack with the sacrifice of only one-third of his force.
This dazzling victory left me cold: I told him the 200th Division was in a very exposed advanced position and should be supported; it was a good division and we could not afford to lose it; its morale would suffer if it were left to bear the brunt of the Jap attack. Chiang K’ai-shek said not to worry about that; I could feel free to order the division to stay and fight to the last man, and I should not be squeamish about it; there would be many times I would have to harden my heart and refuse to listen to calls for help. The thing to do was to let the 200th do the best they could, and hold on to Mandalay itself.
Actually, Mandalay had no military significance and offered no advantages as a position for defense. Chiang had never seen it, but apparently thought of it as a walled city and therefore a strong point. He drew a circle around it on the map and pointed to it dramatically saying, “There is the key to the defense of Burma. Never mind what hap- pens south of it: we must put a strong garrison in Mandalay and hold it.” Since we had already arranged with the British to attempt to hold the Prome-Toungoo line, I kept at him and asked for three more divisions to be sent down. These could make Mandalay safe, while we were fighting to the south. The other units were promised and I finally got permission to move the 22nd to support the 200th, but beyond this he would not go, and it was plain that he was making a concession against his better judgment.
Even after he, the G-mo, had shown me the key to the situation, I was insisting on a different plan and what did it amount to? In spite of his uneasiness, he was letting me move another division forward: this would reduce the garrison of Mandalay to one division, and when we were defeated at Toungoo, we would have lost two divisions instead of only one. In rebuttal, I ventured to say that if we had all three divisions at Toungoo, maybe we would beat the Japs, but this horrified him because it would leave Mandalay (200 miles in the rear) temporarily unoccupied. In this connection, there was an important thing he wanted me to remember, and that was that because of their deficiencies in armament, equipment and transport, it took three Chinese divisions to hold off one Jap division, and an attack on that basis was out of the question. Five Chinese divisions were necessary before an attack could have any hope of success. This was the doctrine that the Chinese Army was saturated with: with the G-mo giving such a lead, the fearful and the incompetent always had a good reason for retreat, and this fitted in with the natural desire of the Chinese commanders to keep their units at as great a strength as possible. The G-mo gave me further instructions in psychology and tactics, and told me if I would observe him and listen for only six months, I could myself learn something of both arts. I emerged from this conference with permission to move one division up behind the 200th in case I felt it desirable on my arrival at the front. Considering his feeling about the matter, this was a handsome concession to make. And in all fairness, it must have been a severe strain on him to put a foreigner in command of regular Chinese troops in action at all. It had never been done before, and he was trying it on short acquaintance with a man he knew little about. Even though, as I found out later, he had ways of effectively circumscribing the authority he apparently delegated without restrictions, the face of the Chinese high command was severely affected, and it put an extra burden on me in my efforts to gain their confidence. I left, feeling that maybe some real executive authority might be ultimately forthcoming, as agreed, in spite of the cockeyed conception of warfare I had been listening to: it was lucky.
当蒋介石告诉我，我将指挥缅甸的中国军队时，我发现他希望我能从他的劝告和经验中受益。当时，200师在东吁，22师即将进驻曼德勒，96师靠近腊戍。
他问我有什么计划，我告诉他我打算在东吁一带把这3个师集结起来，但这一方案未得到同意。他坚持认为，曼德勒是形势的关键所在，他希望把22师和96师部署在那里，以使那里有坚强的防御力量。我们被告知要不惜一切地坚守曼德勒。我告诉他，这将意味着200师被击败，日本人将没有阻碍地直扑曼德勒。我希望把所有的部队集中起来，在尽可能远的地方进行战斗。如果我们能集结起3个师，我们就有可能挡住日本人；而让200师孤立无援就意味着失去它，以后还不得不用仅有的两个师来对抗日本人。不，事情不会这样发展。他以他自己的经验给我举了个例子。他手边刚好有一个郑州的例子，日本人从东面向这个城市逼近。那里有3个师，但是他十分狡猾，没有把它们都部署在前线。
他把其中的一个师部署在郑州，命令它死守；把另外两个师撒到西面约50英里处。日本人进攻时消灭了郑州的那个师。但他们没能再向前推进。你知道为什么吗？他说道，这是由于心理上的原因——日本人对这个师的拼死抵抗留下了深刻印象，他们已不肯再去进攻另外两个师了。于是，他仅仅牺牲了1/3的部队，就阻止了日本人的进攻。
这种辉煌的胜利没有令我动心：我告诉他，200师处于极为凸出的暴露位置，应该得到增援；那是一个很优秀的师，我们不能失去它；如果让它去承受抵抗日军攻击的主要压力，那么它的士气将受到打击。蒋介石说没必要为此担心。我可以命令该师坚守并战斗至最后一兵一卒，不必为此不安，也不必神经过敏。我今后将要反复使自己心如铁石，不去理会要求给予帮助的呼吁。要做的事情就是让200师尽其一切力量，独自坚守。
实际上，曼德勒毫无军事意义，没有一个防御阵地的有利条件。蒋从未认识到这一点，但他显然是认为曼德勒有城墙环绕，因而是个有利的防御据点。他在地图上围着曼德勒画了个圈，指着它用夸张的口吻说，“这里是缅甸防御的关键。别管它的南边发生什么，我们必须在曼德勒部署坚固的防线，保住它。”由于我们已同英国人商定要尽力保住眉谬—东吁防线，因此我坚持要求他再派3个师来。这些师既可以保证曼德勒的安全，同时还可以在南方投入战斗。派遣其他部队得到了保证，我最后也被允许调动22师去支援200师，但除此之外，蒋再也不愿让步半分，显然，他做出的这一让步已违背了他的最佳判断。
甚至在这位大元帅向我讲明了局势的关键所在之后，我依然坚持一项不同的计划，但这有什么意义呢？尽管他十分勉强，但他还是同意我把另一个师调到前方：这将使曼德勒的守卫力量减少到一个师，当我们在东吁败战后，我们将失去两个师而不是仅仅失去一个师。我冒昧地对此进行反驳说，如果我们把3个师都调往东吁，也许我们能够打败日本人，但这个提议使他感到恐慌，因为这将使曼德勒（在东吁后面200英里处）处于暂时无人守卫的状态。接着，他要求我牢牢记住一个十分重要的事实，中国军队由于武器、装备和运输方面的缺陷，需要用3个师去抵挡日本的一个师，在这种基础上发动进攻是根本不可能的。至少要有5个师，进攻才有成功的希望。这就是中国军队一向奉行不违的信条：既然大元帅能带这个头，畏敌如虎者和无能之辈就总是能找到失实的理由向后撤退，这也符合中国指挥官尽可能保存其部队实力的本能愿望。大元帅还就心理和战术问题给我做了进一步的指示。他告诉我，如果我注意观察他的一言一行，只需6个月，我就能够对这两种艺术有所领悟。这次艰难的会议结束后我得到许诺，当我在前线感到有必要时，可以把一个师向前调到200师后面。考虑到他在这个问题上的感受，这已是一个相当大度的让步了。公平地说，对于他，能够让一个外国人在战斗中指挥中国的正规军，肯定是一次极严峻的考验。这种事以前从未有过，而他在试着这样做的时候，和我还刚刚相识，对我所知甚少。我后来发现，即使如此，他也有许多有效的方法来限制权力，但他当初授权时显然未做任何限制，中国最高指挥部的面貌因此而受到很大影响，它也给我争取他们信任的努力增加了额外的困难。我在离开时感到，尽管我听到的是关于战争的荒谬概念，但某种真正的行政权力可能最终将会出现，其他一些人也同意这一看法。幸运的是，我在当时并不知道需要进行多么长的艰苦卓绝的斗争。
3月26日
If the Japs will only subside just for today, we have a chance. Hot day.
I believe the crisis in this business was when Chiang K’ai- shek said he would pull the troops out entirely if the British didn’t hold Prome. He’d have done it too, no matter how hard the British fought. It was essential to get the Chinese committed, and that was my worry when he tied me up and would not release the 22nd and 96th. (The way to handle him is undoubtedly the slow way, letting the ideas trickle. Therefore always be slow to put an unacceptable plan into action.) Japs were active all night.
Pyawbwe road-riot among British soldiers at Yenangyaung. British destroying the oil fields. GooD GoD. What are we fighting for? Civil government orders. Hell to pay on the railroad. Crews running away. No trains below Pyinmana. No trucks. How [shall I] get the 22nd [Division] in? Report of Japs at Yedashe [see map, page 57] cutting road, and railroad. Finally got phone call to Liao 2-groundless. Long belly- ache back and forth.
Tu had one of his depressed fits and everything was wrong. The track might spread, the trip was dangerous, how protect the trains, etc., etc. Everything was against attack. “Mei yu pan fa” [It’s impossible]. Christ, he’s terrible when he’s like that. Arranged for shuttle, Pyinmana to Yedashe. Told Martin to hold a gun on the crews and get the trains through. Captain Snow working on it. We are staying here tonight and will let it simmer. Tomorrow tsai shuo [we will discuss again]. (Tu is a hard guy to handle; he must have everything just so.) Sent Wyman and Haymaker to Pyinmana to report. Last train of 22nd passed Pyawbwe at 7: 0o. Looks a bit better. Snow phoned he could get them through. Wy- man back at 10: 45. Encouraging.
Went to see Tu. Queer reception. (Lin, Tu, Shao, all in the dumps.) It came out that they thought the 200th had been wiped out. 12: 30 last message. Was to be every two hours and they had given up mentally. I felt the 200th was still there and kept talking attack. Argument after argument. Tu went into his room and wouldn’t come out.
At 1: 00 a.m. a message from Tai [the commanding general of the 200th]. O.K. in Toungoo. Well, once again, gloom to joy. “Now we can do it,” etc. I insisted that we attack on the 27th, early or late pu yao chin [it makes no difference] but ATTACK. Tu said “Ming T’ien i ting kung chi” [Tomorrow we certainly attack]. Well, a terrific load rolled off me. I had visions of the 200th gone, and the 22nd compromised and what not. Now it’s just a question of getting the 22nd in. A report at 3: 00 a.m. from Lin indicated that two trains were still at Pyinmana. (Anybody that wants my job can have it.) At 9: 00, Snow reported all five trains had cleared. Now Tu says he isn’t concerned about troops, but rations. Holy Christ.
The basic cause is Chiang K’ai-shek’s refusal to me to concentrate at Pyinmana. Everything trails from that and the delay by Chiang K’ai-shek of the 22nd at Mandalay. Some bastard at Pyinmana stopped the move from 1: 00 to 4: 00 a.m. Who was it? (Tu is too far back, too lackadaisical, doesn’t supervise execution. To think that a victory can be compromised by a goddam slip on the railroad.)
只要日本人今天不采取任何行动，我们就有机会了。天气炎热。
蒋介石说如果英国人丢掉了眉谬，他就把军队都撤回去，我相信这正是此事的危机所在。不管英国人战斗得多么艰苦，他也会这样干。关键是要让中国人投入战斗，我担心的是他对我横加干涉，不让22师和96师采取行动。（无疑，同他打交道需用慢功，慢慢地透露自己的想法。因此，在实施一个未被接受的计划时，一定要审慎进行）
日本人整夜都很活跃。
在标贝公路上的仁安羌，英国士兵发生了骚乱，英国人正在摧毁油田。天哪。我们究竟是为何而战？文官政府发号施令。铁路运输一塌糊涂。职员们正在逃跑。彬马那以下不通火车了，还没有卡车。
我怎么才能使22师投入战斗呢？有报告说耶达谢的日本人已切断了公路和铁路。终于给[22师指挥官]廖耀湘打通了电话。肚子不时作痛，有一段时间了。
杜聿明再次在窘境中歇斯底里地发作了，一切都坏透了。运输能力也许可以扩大，但运输是很危险的，如何保护火车呢？等等，等等。所有情况都不利于进攻。“没有办法。”天哪，他发作时十分可怕。安排从彬马那至耶达谢之间的穿梭运输。告诉马丁让他用枪押着职工，把火车开起来。斯诺上尉负责此事。我们今天晚上将住在这里，让争吵降降温。明天再说。（杜聿明是个很难对付的人，他肯定在所有事情上都是如此。）派怀曼和海梅克去彬马那报告。22师的最后一列火车于7点钟通过标贝。看来略有转机。斯诺来电话说他能够让火车开起来。怀曼10点45分回来了。情况令人鼓舞。
去见杜聿明。古怪的接待方式。（林、杜和邵在一起，都很沮丧。）他们显然认为200师已被歼灭。12点30分接到最后一次消息。每两小时来一次消息，他们在精神上已经垮掉了。我感到200师仍在那里坚持，因而一直在谈进攻的事。反复地争论。杜聿明走进房间，再也没出来。
下午1点，从戴安澜那里得到消息。很好，他们在东吁。好了，忧虑再次变成了欢乐。“现在我们可以动手了”，等等。我坚持我们应在27日发动进攻，早一点或晚一点都不要紧，但必须进攻。杜聿明说“明天一定攻击”。这样一来，我如释重负。我知道200师已疲惫不堪，22师也受到一些损失，但谁没受损失呢。现在的问题就是投入22师。下午3点接到了林的一份报告，报告表明2列火车仍滞留在彬马那。9点钟，斯诺报告说所有5列火车都已通过。现在杜聿明又说他担心的不是军队，而是给养。我的天哪。
根本原因是蒋介石不允许我在彬马那集结军队。一切后果都可归因于此，还有蒋介石所造成的22师在曼德勒的耽搁。彬马那的一个狗杂种在凌晨1点至4点间使调动陷于停顿。这是谁？（杜聿明太高高在上，太懒散了，没有去监督计划的执行情况。想一想，一场胜利竟因铁路上一个该死的疏忽而受挫。）
校对语：关于新22师部署以及集结问题可与电报栏目以下电文对照：
1942/03/12杜聿明电蒋中正新二二师、九十六师定于14日集中完毕并由遮放向腊戍运输
1942/03/14林蔚电何应钦徐永昌200师位于同古N22D与96D位于芒市暂不移动及其他军情
1942/03/21史迪威致何应钦徐永昌在同古与日军决战部署新廿二师居TAUNGDWINGYI归史直接指挥
1942/03/26萧毅肃致何应钦徐永昌同古200师激战新22师加速输送中
3月27日
To bed at 2: 30. Conflicting reports at 9:00 a.m. of [22nd Division] move through Pyinmana. Finally sure that two trains are still there. 2: 00 p.m. Everything is optimism once more. 6sth and 64th [Regiments] in position, 66th behind them, guns and tanks, ready. Jump-off at 4: 00 p.m. Japs burning outskirts. Leaving? Too much to expect.
Later. It was too good. Now they [the Chinese] are down again. “They have 49 tanks,” “They have 105’s etc.”-Tu. Wants to wait till situation gets tough, I guess. 200th easier. 22nd can be ready tomorrow a.m. “Will they attack then?” “Wel, don’t know. Must shang liang [think it over].” Tu again went into his room. I guess it’s impossible.
At 6: 00 Martin in to say that the British had started to withdraw from Prome. Well, this will raise hell. Martin much ashamed about it. What to do? Tu is too much for me. I can announce that I can’t command troops that won’t attack. Showdown on Tu. What can Chiang K’ai-shek do? Long talk with him. Tu and Lin are playing politics, of course. And Chiang K’ai-shek corresponds with both. So they try to kick me around. Lin Wei shoved off without telling me; he was afraid of being pinned. Left at 10: 00.
2点30分睡觉。上午9点，接到了几份[22师]经彬马那向前调动的相互矛盾的报告。最后确认有2列火车还在那里。下午2点钟，情况又乐观起来。65团和64团已进入阵地，66团在它们后面，大炮和坦克已做好准备。下午4点开始进攻。日本人在郊区放火。准备撤退？有太多可期待的东西。
后来，情况好过了头。现在他们的情绪再次低落下去。“他们有49辆坦克”，“他们有105火炮”等等——杜聿明。我猜想，杜聿明是想等到形势变得严峻起来。200师的压力减轻了。22师明天上午可以做好准备。“他们那时会进攻吗？”“呃，不知道。必须商量一下。”杜再次走进他的房间。我想此事已经没有指望。
6点钟，马丁来了，他说英国人已开始从眉谬撤退。这将引起可怕的后果。马丁对此十分羞愧。该怎么办？杜聿明实在让我头痛。我可以宣布我没有办法指挥不去进攻的军队。同杜聿明摊牌。蒋介石能做些什么？同他长谈。当然，杜聿明和林蔚都在玩弄诡计。蒋介石一直在同他们联系。因此他们试图以势压人。林蔚没跟我告别就走了；他害怕受到拖累。10点钟离开。
3月28日
In [Maymyo] at 3: 30 a.m. Saw Alexander. Alex said Chiang K’ai-shek agreed to command by British. British planes all gone to India. No one at headquarters knew about it. Oh, you independent air force.
Saw Lin Wei, who agreed with me throughout. Kept at him till he agreed to [transmit] the ming ling [the order] to’Tu. So he takes orders, finally and under pressure. O.K. I won’t fool with Tu but make Lin do it: 22nd [Division] to attack. g6th to hurry in and back up. 55th to dig at Pyinmana. Will they get it off? I wonder. Letter from Madame [Chiang]. British command accepted by Chiang K’ai-shek. Talked with staff. Notified Alexander and Lin Wei. Shoved off at 4: 00. Reached Pyawbwe at 10: 00(rock on road–just a bit of sabotage). Tu came in and talked about the situation and the attack tomorrow. He accepts the order all right. Thinks we’ve lost our chance. (Whose fault is that?)We will go around the salient and cut in from three directions-at midnight phoned Maymyo to have Gruber call on Alexander for a real attack, not just a piddle. Major Hill took the message.
凌晨3点30分到达[眉谬]，会见了亚历山大。亚历山大说蒋介石同意由英国人来指挥。
英国的飞机都飞到了印度，司令部里竟无人知道此事。噢，你们独立的空军部队。
见到了林蔚，他完全同意我的意见。一直跟他在一起，直到他同意向杜聿明传达命令。就这样，他终于在压力下接受了命令。很好。我不想同杜聿明开玩笑，而是让林蔚去干这件事：22师进行攻击，96师进行支援，55师在彬马那穿插。他们能干好吗？我怀疑。接到了蒋夫人来信。蒋同意由英国人指挥。同参谋人员谈话。通知了亚历山大和林蔚。
4点钟离开。10点钟到达标贝，杜聿明来了，谈论局势和明天的进攻。他已经接受了命令。想想我们已经失去了机会。（这是谁的过错呢？）我们将绕过凸出部，从3个方向切入——午夜给眉谬去电话，让格鲁伯要求亚历山大进行一次真正的攻击，而不再是一次胡闹。希尔少校带去了这个信息。
3月29日
(2: 00 A.M.) Maymyo called. “Message de- livered. They promise to do it.”(Hot day.) Left at 9: 30. Yedashe at 12: 40. As usual, they are dogging it. General Liao, the 22nd Division’s commanding general, is a colorless bird. He wants to wait for the 96th [Division] and I suppose the commanding general of the 96th for the 55th, etc. Full of excuses-how strong the Jap positions are, and how reinforcements are coming to them, etc. Two days ago it would have been easy, but now. They’ll drag it out and do nothing, unless I can somehow kick them into it. The order read: “Push in outpost either tomorrow or day after, attack in force toward Toungoo.”
Tu goes back [to rear]; I must also, or be thought to be interfering [with his troops] behind his back. O.K. I’ll try to be patient a bit longer. Hot as hell. We were all dried out and exhausted. I am mentally about shot. Merrill back at 9: 00. Limcys will attack in force with all tanks. Good old Slim. Maybe he’s all right after all. Order of the day is that “Chinese are attacking under extreme difficulties and it’s up to the British to follow the example.” Gave this to Tu in plain language and called on him for a real effort. Full of excuses as usual. Now wants to go back to Pyinmana and has held the 2nd Regiment of the g6th Division there, thus making it impossible to concentrate at Yedashe in time. [See map, page 57.] (Wind up on sabotage. Also the sit regiment is being held at Yedashe because a Jap flank detachment is out there somewhere. It’s all a bunch of crap. By Jesus, I’m about fed up.
（凌晨2点）眉谬来电话。“信息已递交。他们答应照办。”（天气炎热。）9点30分离开。12点40分到达耶达谢。像以往一样，他们对此事又在搪塞躲避。22师指挥官廖耀湘将军是个毫无特色的家伙。他要等待96师，我想96师的指挥官还要等55师，如此等等。一大堆借口——日本人的阵地是如何坚固，增援部队正在赶来，等等。两天以前完成这项任务还算容易，但现在···他们仍在拖延，什么事也不干，除非我能设法迫使他们去干。命令写道：“明天或后天从前沿向前推进，向东吁全力进攻。”
杜聿明从前线返回；我也必须回后方，否则会被认为是在背着他行事。好吧，今后一段时间我要试着耐心点儿。热得要死。我们都被晒干了，精疲力竭。我在精神上几乎崩溃了。梅里尔9点钟回来了。英国人将以全部坦克全力进攻。老斯利姆好样的。也许他这个人整个并不坏。今天的安排是：“中国人将在极为困难的情况下发动进攻，然后就取决于英国人是否以中国人为榜样去做。”以简明的语言把这个意图告诉了杜聿明，要求他做一次真正的努力。像以往一样，他又找出了种种借口。他打算回彬马那，让96师2团留在那里，这样将使预期在耶达谢的集结成为泡影。由于日本的一支侧攻部队出现在耶达谢，那里的1团也受到阻碍。都是一大堆废话。我发誓，我快要受不了了。
3月30日
To bed at 1: 30 as usual. Alternatives now at hand. Let it ride and do nothing. Resign flatly. Ooze out and demand own force (make a statement “Now that command is unified [under Alexander I believe it would unnecessarily complicate the situation if I or third country national re- main”).
Shoved off at 9:30. Liao and Tu have dogged it again. The pusillanimous bastards. No attack at all. Front quiet, no Jap reaction. Just craven. Liao [commander of 22nd Division] moved command post back a mile. Tu ordered him not to attack till o6th and 55th get in. Wavell here.
像往常一样1点30分上床睡觉。机会本来就在手里，却让它溜走了，无所作为。坚决辞职。透露了这一打算并要求有自己的部队。（做了一项声明：“既然指挥权已统一在亚历山大之下，我相信，如果我或者一个第三国的国民还留在这里，将使局势变得不必要的复杂化”）。
9点30分离去。廖和杜仍在闪烁其词。压根就没有进攻。前线平静无事，日本人没有反应。十足的懦夫。廖把指挥部向后移了一英里。杜命令他在96师和55师赶到前不要进攻。韦维尔来了。
校对语：关于新22师进攻南阳车站以及接应200师撤退具体情况可与电报栏目以下电文对照：
1942/03/28林蔚致蒋中正战况有变暂缓决战及廖师已占领NANGYUA（南阳）车站等情
1942/03/29杜聿明致蒋中正200师向西当河转进及新22师在叶达西阻敌等情
1942/03/30杜聿明电蒋中正戴安澜师转移情况及廖耀湘师击毙敌少校大队长夺获武器等语
体制[日记中未注明日期的字条]
Chiang K’ai-shek says” J. W. Stilwell can command the Fifth and Sixth Armies.” Then I get lengthy harangues on the psychology of the Chinese soldier, and how the Fifth and Sixth must not be defeated or the morale of the Army and the nation will crumble, together with a cockeyed strategical conception based on the importance of Mandalay. Then I have a chief of staff assignment from Chiang K’ai- shek’s headquarters. So I go to work.
Then the flood of letters begins. To Tu. To Lin Wei. To me. All of them direct. I never see half of them. They direct all sorts of action and preparation with radical changes based on minor changes in the situation. The Chinese commanders are up and down-highly optimistic one minute; in the depths of gloom the next. They feel, of course, the urgent necessity of pleasing the Generalissimo, and if my suggestions or orders run counter to what they think he wants they offer endless objections. When I brush off these objections, they proceed to positive measures-for instance, stopping the move of a regiment until it is too late to bring it to bear -or just fail to get the order out, or getting it out with a lot of “ifs” and”ands” in it, or when pushed, simply telling lower commanders to lay off and not carry it out. Or just put on a demonstration and report opposition too strong. I can’t shoot them; I can’t relieve them; and just talking to them does no good. So the upshot of it is that I am the stooge who does the dirty work and takes the rap. (This is what I hope will be corrected by the conference April 1.)
蒋介石说：“J·W·史迪威可以指挥第五军和第六军。”接着我聆听了一通高谈阔论，内容涉及中国军人的心理，以及千万不能让第五军和第六军遭到败绩，否则军队和国家的士气将一蹶不振。我同时还听到了一个荒谬的战略概念，其基础是曼德勒的重要性。接着我从蒋介石的司令部中得到了一位参谋长。于是我便走马上任了。
此后，信件潮水般地涌来，给杜聿明的、给林蔚的、给我的，每封信都发出指示。我看到的信从未超过半数。这些信件对各种行动做出指示，因局势的微小变动而准备做出重大的变化。中国的指挥官们摇摆不定——忽而极其乐观；忽而深深地陷入沮丧失望。当然，他们感到最紧切的需要就是讨好大元帅，如果我的建议或命令与他们所认为的他[指蒋介石]的意图相左，他们就会提出无数的反对意见。当我固执地驳斥了这些反对意见后，他们就采取一些实际措施——例如，停止某一个团的调动，而等到再想调动它时已为时太晚了——或者是故意不下达命令；或者是下达命令，但在命令中加上许多“如果”和“以及”；或者是在受到敦促时，直截了当地告诉下级军官阳奉陰违，不予执行；或者是假装采取行动，然后报告说敌人太强大。我不能枪毙他们；我不能撤他们的职；不过同他们谈话是毫无益处的。因此最终结果就是我成了一个没有权力的走卒，受苦受累地工作，还要忍受着责备。（这就是我希望能在4月1日的会议上得到纠正的现象。）
4月1日
Am I the April fool? From 3/19 to 4/1 in Burma, struggling with the Chinese, the British, my own people, the supply, the medical service, etc., etc. Incidentally, with the Japs.
Through stupidity, fear, and the defensive attitude we have lost a grand chance to slap the Japs back at Toungoo. The basic reason is Chiang K’ai-shek’s meddling. Had he let me concentrate at Pyinmana, we would have been set to attack. Had he not stopped the 22nd Division when I ordered it in, we would have had plenty of force to cut off the Japs when they first went around Toungoo. Had he not gone behind my back to Tu and Lin Wei, they might have obeyed my orders. He can’t keep his hands off: 1,6oo miles from the front, he writes endless instructions to do this and that, based on fragmentary information and a cockeyed conception of tactics. He thinks he knows psychology; in fact, he thinks he knows everything, and he wobbles this way and that, changing his mind at every change in the action. We hang on, and he says, “Get all set for a push right into Rangoon.” He gets a gloomy report and sends word to dig in at Pyinmana. He curses the British for falling back, and does the same thing himself without reference to them. He is hipped on holding Mandalay and can’t see that the way to hold it is to lick the Japs at Toungoo. He lets the native sabotage decide the strategy of the campaign. He tells me to keep in my own sector and have nothing to do with the British and then says Alexander can command. He lets Yü Fei- p’eng send me 5o trucks when I tell him I need 150.
His constant interference and letter writing have the effect of completely nullifying my little authority. I have no troops, no bodyguard, no authority to shoot anybody. The army and division commanders are vitally interested in doing what they think he wants them to do. Why should they obey me?
Saw ××× He knows. Spilled the beans. Said Chiang K’ai-shek himself was ordering retirement to Pyinmana line. At 12: 00 went down [to Chiang K’ai-shek] and threw the raw meat on the floor. It was quite a shock. Pulled no punches and said I’d have to be relieved. He said,” Why won’t they obey?” “I’ll investigate and if the divisional commander disobeyed, I’ll shoot him.” “Did General Tu order a retreat?” “I can tell them they must obey and we can straighten it out,”etc., etc. I asked him to think it over and proposed a new army of Burma, under my command. Asked him to consider that too. Said probably I would not be accepted now, anyway, and that since Chinese had accepted British command presence of a third country national was no longer necessary. Told him, however, I couldn’t put American air units in support of troops in whose commanders I had no confidence.
It was a very frank interview, and the bombs burst rather loudly. In plain words, the army and division commanders had failed to obey, and I had insufficient authority to force them to obey. Shang Chen is shocked and Chiang K’ai-shek and Madame are worried.
How to evade obeying an order? By General Tu, commanding the Fifth Army. “How can we attack? They have 1o5s and we have only 75s,” or “They have 49 tanks,” or “The g6th can’t get here in time.”(Create a condition by failing to act, and then plead it as an excuse for not acting. For instance, fail to move the leading regiment of the g6th by truck.) Or “They have a flank detachment out there.” (“Well, put a battalion against it and go ahead.” “But it takes a regiment to hold a Jap battalion.”) Or” These are new troops; we have to give them a chance to get used to it,” or “The Burmese are making trouble in our rear,” or” The trains will run off the track,”(actually). Or “There is a break on the Taunggyi line which will take three days to repair,”etc., etc.
Tu’s method of getting rid of my impertinent suggestions for attacks was to go out and telephone. He would scream and yell over the phone endlessly, sometimes not even appearing when I left. My nominal position being his tsung ssu ling [commander in chief], this was of course a serious breach of manners. Lin Wei, my alleged chief of staff, simply ran away from Pyawbwe to Maymyo without telling me he was going. This was when he felt the attack by the 22nd was going to be forced. I chased right after him and caught him at midnight in Maymyo. Away from Tu, he agreed absolutely with me, and got the order out. Then, of course, the “system” got going, and Tu nullified the order by telling Liao to simply put on an act. The fact that Tu felt he could treat me with gross discourtesy indicates that he took his cue from the highest quarters. What a gag. I have to tell Chiang K’ai-shek with a straight face that his subordinates are not carrying out his orders, when in all probability they are doing just what he tells them. In justice to all of them, however, it is expecting a great deal to have them turn over a couple of armies in a vital area to a goddam foreigner that they don’t know and in whom they can’t have much confidence.
The worst has happened in the press. Before I have a chance to get my feet on the ground, a flood of crap is re- leased, to justify which I would have to be in Rangoon within a week. What a sucker I’ll look like if the Japs run me out of Burma. I hope this command business is settled promptly, so I can go back to the front and hide.
愚人节。我是愚人吗？从3月19日到4月1日一直在缅甸，
同中国人、英国人、我自己的同胞斗争；同供应、医疗服务等斗争；偶尔，还要同日本人斗争。
由于愚蠢、恐惧和防守的态度，我们失去了一个在东吁打退日本人的绝好机会。根本原因在于蒋介石的插手。如果他允许我在彬马那集结力量，那我们早就做好进攻的部署了。当我命令22师投入时，如果他不加以阻止，我们便有足够的力量截断刚刚到达东吁的日本人。如果不是他在我背后对杜和林蔚进行指挥，他们或许会服从我的命令。他无法做到不插手的允诺：他身处距前线1600英里以外的地方，写下一道接一道的指令，要我们去做这做那，其根据是零散不全的情报和一种荒谬的战术观念。他自认为懂得心理学；他自认为懂得一切。他反复无常，随着行动中的每一个微小变化而不断改变主意。当我们停下来的时候，他说，“做好进攻仰光的一切部署。”在接到一份悲观的报告后，又下令在彬马那就地驻扎。他埋怨英国人的溃败，但他自己也在未通知他们的情况下做着同样的事情。他对保卫曼德勒如痴如迷，但却没有看到要保住它就得在东吁击退日本人。他任由当地人中的叛变分子决定了这场战争的战略。他告诉我管好自己的部队，不要同英国人打交道；然后又说亚历山大可以指挥。当我告诉他我需要150辆卡车时，他只让俞飞鹏拨给我50辆。
他不停地插手干预，不断地写信，其效果就是使我本来就很小的权威消失得无影无踪。我没有军队，没有警卫，没有枪决任何人的权力。军级和师级指挥官最感兴趣的，是去做他们认为他要他们去做的事。他们为什么要服从我呢？
见到了×××[一名中国军官]。他了解情况。他透露了其中的秘密。据他说，下令撤退到彬马那一线的就是蒋介石本人。
12点钟去见他[指蒋介石]并同他摊了牌。我言辞激烈，我说我必须被解职。他说，“他们为什么不服从？”“我要调查，如果师级指挥官不服从命令，我就枪毙他。”“杜将军下令撤退了吗？”“我可以告诉他们，他们必须服从命令，我们可以把它纠正过来。”等等，等等。我要求他认真考虑一下，我还提议再派一个军去缅甸，归我指挥。我要求他对此也予以考虑。我说，也许无论如何，我现在不会被接受，因为中国人已接受了英国人的领导，一个第三国国民的存在已不再有必要了。但是，我告诉他，我不能让美国空军去支持我对其不信任的指挥官指挥的军队。
这次会见十分坦率。我投下的那些炸弹发出了巨大的轰响。简单地说，如果军级和师级指挥官不服从命令，我没有足够的权力去强迫他们服从。商震感到震惊，蒋介石和夫人忧心忡忡。
如何逃避服从命令呢？第五军指挥官杜将军是用下面的方法。“我们怎么能进攻呢？他们有105门火炮，而我们只有75门火炮”，或“他们有49辆坦克”，或“96师不能及时赶到这里”（未能采取行动以创造出一种条件，接着以此为借口不采取行动。例如，没能以卡车运送96师的先遣团），或“他们的一支侧翼部队已到了这里”（“好吧，派一个营去阻击它，继续前进。”“但阻挡日本人的一个营要用一个团的兵力。”），或“这些是刚成立的部队，我们必须给他们一个机会去适应”，或“缅甸人正在我们的后方制造麻烦”，或“火车总是出轨”，或“东枝线中断，需要修理，得等3天”，等等，等等。
当我毫不客气地提议进攻时，杜摆脱它的方法也是出去打电话。他常常对着话筒没完没了地喊叫，有时甚至在我离去时也不露面。我名义上的职务还是他的总司令，这当然是一种很不得体的态度。我所谓的参谋长林蔚，连个招呼也没和我打，就从标贝跑到眉谬去了。当时他已察觉到将会用强硬手段迫使22师发动进攻。我立即寻踪追去，于午夜在眉谬找到了他。杜不在身边，于是他同我绝对一致，把命令发了出去。当然，“体制”接着便发挥了作用，杜聿明告诉廖耀湘只去装装行动的样子，从而使这项命令失效。
杜聿明如此粗暴无礼地对待我，这表明他从最高指挥机构那里得到了暗示。这是多么可笑。我必须严肃地告诉蒋介石，他的部下没有执行他的命令，而实际上他们很可能恰恰是在按照他的吩咐行事。但是，为他们所有的人说句公道话，让他们在一个极其关键的地区把两个军交给一名该死的外国人，而他们对此人又所知甚少，没有什么信任，这未免期望过高了。
最糟糕的事情在新闻界发生了。在我还没有机会站稳脚跟时，一大堆流言蜚语已传了出来，要想洗清冤屈，我就必须在一周内到达仰光。如果日本人把我赶出了缅甸，那么我看上去将是一个什么样的傻瓜呀。我希望能迅速解决指挥权的事，这样我就能重返前线，大干一场。
4月9日
Up at 8: oo. [Jap] plane over for an hour. Long talk with Lo and Tu about the situation. The boys are breathing death and destruction. Concentrate [Fifth Army] in Pyinmana area and fight. Kan [Sixth Army] to fight south of Loikaw and watch approaches. The whole point, of course, is making them stick to the plan. 4: 00 p.m. Chow with Tu.
5: 30 shoved off for “front.”2ooth Division formed up north of Pyinmana. Fine-looking lot of soldiers. We all made speeches. Mine was very chien tan [simple]. Lo screamed for 3o minutes. Then Tu for 15. On to 96th [Division]. Oficers lined up in dark at Pyinmana. Yü is commanding general, schoolteacher type. Indecisive, looks weak. On to 22nd Division. Liao talked and talked. A lot of crap at high speed. He impresses me as being empty. The usual bunk about losses: 14 days in line, and 1, 3oo casualties. They got a live Jap today. All the villages burning. Stink of corpses and burnt wood. Back at 4: 34 a.m.
8点钟起床。[日本]飞机在上空盘旋了一小时。与罗卓英和杜聿明就形势长谈。他们表现出失败的情绪。集结[第五军]于彬马那地区，作战。甘丽初[第六军]将在垒固以南作战，伺机攻击前进。当然，关键还在于让他们坚持原计划。下午4点与杜一起吃饭。
5点30分去“前线”。200师在彬马那以北编队。许多士兵看上去情况良好。我们都讲了话。我的讲话很简单。罗喊叫了30分钟。接着杜讲了15分钟。去96师。军官们在黑暗中列队于彬马那。余[96师师长余韶]是指挥官，他是个学校老师模样的人。不果断，看上去有些瘦弱。去22师。廖讲起来没完。讲得很快但全是废话。他给我的印象就是空洞。关于损失的老一套废话：在前线14天，伤亡1300人。他们今天抓到了一名日本俘虏。所有的村庄都在燃烧。尸体和焦木头的臭味。凌晨4点34分回来。
4月18日
Dorn woke me at 3: 00. Merrill back. British in hell of a jam [at Yenangyaung]. Got up; got Lo up and got going. [I ordered] 200th Division to Meiktila by truck and train. One battalion of 38th to Myingyan. 22nd and g6th Divisions delay back to Pyawbwe. [See map page 57.]There is a hole from Ywanua to Kyaukpadaung and beyond.
Lo Co. took this blow well. All our plans knocked to pieces. And in three days the picture might have been so different. To bed at 5: 30.
Up at 7: 30. Three AVGs for breakfast. (N.B. The way the boys look at me in the jams, dead-pan, to see how I take it. “Now what are you going to do?” and” Will it break you down I wonder?” I feel like an animal in the zoo.) 200th moving. (Three trains tonight, I hope. It’s a hell of a strain to just sit helpless, and wonder if that 60-mile hole can be filled up in time.)
Report of Tokyo bombing on radio.
Merrill in at 10: 3o. Much better news. Burmese in Yenangyaung, Japs-1, 500-south of it. British closing in on Magwe. Christ-what a relief! Still critical, but by the 1gth the 200th will be in position to smack 3,000 [Japs] reported moving on Kyaukpadaung (maybe).
多恩3点钟把我叫醒。梅里尔回来了。英国人陷入了绝境（在仁安羌）。起床。把罗叫醒，出发。（我命令）200师乘卡车和火车赶往密铁拉。38师的一个营赶往敏建。22师和96师推迟回标贝。从尤努至皎勃东及其以远的地方出现了一个漏洞。
罗和科很好地承受住了这一打击。我们的所有计划都被打碎了。仅3天时间局势竟发生了这样大的变化。5点30分睡觉。
7点30分起床。3名志愿航空队员来吃早饭。（我注意到那些小伙子们正不动声色地看着我处在绝境之中，他们想看看我如何应付它。“现在你打算怎么办？”“我想知道这会使你崩溃吗？”我感到自己像是动物园里的一只困兽。）200师在调动。（今晚3列火车。希望如此。干坐着帮不上忙，也不知道那个60英里的大洞能否得到及时的填补，这实在让人紧张。）
收音机里播放了东京被轰炸的消息。
梅里尔10点30分来访。更令人振奋的消息：缅甸人已到达仁安羌，1500名日本人在它的南面。英国人已离马圭不远了。天哪，多么令人欣慰！局势依然危急，但19日200师就能到达预定位置，猛打据报告说（可能）正在向皎勃东逼近的3000名日本人。
4月25日
Message the Japs are 40 miles north of Loilem. 5: 3o a.m. message from Lo, says he has very important news. Must confer. g6th [at center] chewed up. So Meiktila is wide open. Must get a garrison somewhere. Called Alexander to come down. O.K. 200th got to 4 miles west of Taunggyi.
Alexander and Winterton in. Will send a brigade of 17th Division [British] to Meiktila at once. Winterton had to write out a Leavenworth order, the jackass. Liao in from 22nd [Division], heavily attacked at Pyawbwe. Will hang on till tomorrow night. That may let the Fifth Army special troops and trucks, and the 66th Infantry (Regiment) slip back through the hole east of Thazi. It will be a close call. Then we all fade for Mandalay and its one bridge. I hope it’s still there. The 200th did not get Taunggyi and will go on for Hopong. A glimmer of hope there.
But all we can get to Mandalay will be the 38th, 22nd, scraps of g6th. This has been a horrible mental day, and at lunch if six Jap planes didn’t dump a load almost on us. How the boys did jump for cover. (65, 000 gallons of gas and 85o trucks at Lashio about April 18. 105 [trucks] came down to haul rice and gas. 55 of Yü Fei-p’eng and 50 he borrowed from the Central Bank, food administrator.)
（凌晨2点）有消息说，日本人已到达莱林以北40英里处。早上5点30分，罗卓英传话，说他有十分重要的消息，必须商量一下。温特顿必须写出一个利文沃思式的命令，这头蠢驴。廖耀湘从22师赶回来，22师在标贝遭到猛烈攻击，将坚持到明天晚上。这将使第五军的特种部队和卡车、第66步兵团从达西东部的缺口穿回去。这将是一次侥幸的脱险。之后我们都将逃往曼德勒，那里有一座大桥，我希望它还在那里。200师没有夺取东枝，将向和榜进发。那里还有一线希望。但是，我们能够带到曼德勒的部队只有38师、22师和96师的余部了。这是一个精神上备受磨难的日子，午饭时，6架日本飞机把大量炸弹几乎扔在了我们的头上。那些家伙怎么不跳出去隐蔽一下。（大约在4月18日，6.5万加仑的汽油和850辆卡车到达腊戍。105辆卡车来这里运大米和汽油。55辆是俞飞鹏的，50辆是他从中央银行负责食品的官员那里借的。）
4月27日
Left at 4: 00 a.m. Came on across Ava bridge at daylight. Car going bad. In Shwebo at 8: 00. Bawled the hell out of Lo, who shoved off to get Tu going. 6: 00 p.m. 1. Alexander, Winterton, and Lo in. Chewed over the situation. Q. Reconnaissance? No got. Limeys as usual knew nothing. Asked Alec about original plan of withdrawal. 38”Oh, tanks can’t operate over there now, it’s too wet.” Very loath to turn 38th Division loose.
We will use 22nd and g6th with one regiment of 28th to delay on Myiting [River]. Then cross over and go up the railroad to Bhamo. (Letter from Chiang K’ai-shek. His system is to get a wire about what we’ve done and then issue instructions to do it. Anyway, he says, to stay in Burma, which is more than British will do. They are on their way.) Lo accepts everything I say, now.
凌晨4点离开。天亮后过了阿瓦桥。汽车总出毛病。8点钟到达瑞保。把罗卓英臭骂了一顿，他去催促杜聿明了。晚6点，亚历山大、温特顿和罗卓英来了。讨论了局势。问题：侦察了吗？没有。英国人还一如既往地什么也不知道。向亚历山大询问最初的撤退计划的情况。“噢，坦克目前在那里无法行动，雨太多了。”很不情愿地派出38师。
我们将以22师、96师和28师的一个团在密埃河边断后。然后过河，沿铁路前往八莫。（蒋介石来信。他的体制将得到一份关于我们已采取了哪些行动的电报，然后再下达去执行的命令。他说，无论如何要留在缅甸，我们将比英国人干得更出色。他们在走他们自己的路。）现在，罗卓英接受了我说的一切。
4月28日
Japs halfway to Hsipaw, both roads blocked. If 200th gets to Loilem, 9 the Japs will be in trouble.
The division commander of the 28th [Division] refused to obey Tu’s order and Chang [commanding officer]66th Regiment refused to obey Lo’s order. Lin Wei is issuing orders also. It promises to be a mess.
Went to 96th [Division] command post at mile 9 on Maymyo road. Yü [commander, 96th Division] is a pitiful object. Entirely oblivious of his troops, he was drinking tea and fanning himself. Cried all over the place. I got disgusted and left. Dumb Tu gave the g6th [Division] (1,ooo fighting men)2o miles of front [to defend], and the 22nd [Division], with two regiments (4,000 men), about 5 miles. Back in Shwebo at 3: 20.
日本人正在向昔卜开来，两条路都已被封锁。如果200师到达莱林①，日本人将遇到麻烦。
28师的指挥官拒不服从杜聿明的命令，66团[指挥官]张拒不服从罗卓英的命令。林蔚也在发号施令。情况一团混乱。
去96师设在眉谬公路9英里处的指挥部。余韶是个可恶的家伙。他置他的部队于不顾，一边品着茶，一边摇着扇子。大喊大叫了一通儿。我感到十分厌恶，离开了那里。沉默寡言的杜聿明让96师（1000名战斗人员）防守20英里的战线，22师和两个团（4000人）防守5英里。3点20分回到瑞保。
①位于向昔卜运动的日本师团的南部和后方。
4月29日
Got Lo over and gave him the dope. He had al- ready issued orders for the g6th to go to Myitkyina and the 22nd to fight delaying action so I left it alone. Sending bulk of our command post upriver tomorrow. Shwebo bombed by 27 Jap bastards today. Ugly rumor from Limey liaison officer that Chinese are leaving Lashio. Radioed Chiang K’ai-shek about General Lu of 28th Division disobedience. God, if we can only get those 100,000 Chinese to India, we’ll have something.
帮助罗卓英恢复勇气，使他振作起来。他已经发布了命令，96师去密支那，22师进行阻击战，因此我未加干涉。明天将把我们指挥部的大部转移到河的上游。27架该死的日本飞机今天轰 炸了瑞保。英国的联络官传出可鄙的谣言，说中国人正撤出腊戍。 给蒋介石打电报，关于28师的刘将军不服从命令的事。上帝，只要我们能使这10万名中国人到印度去，我们肯定能成就一番事业。
4月30日
They will blow the bridge on tonight. Last night word came that Lashio was taken. (Chiang K’ai-shek sent a radio that we were to hold Mandalay!! This a.m. he sent another that we need not hold Mandalay.) Alex and Winterton in. Aleck’s wind is up. Now it looks as if the Japs would rush to Bhamo. Radioed for plane to go back to Lashio front. Lo wanted to go by railroad for some reason or other. His gang will, but he and I will take the plane. Our crowd direct to Myitkyina. Asked War Department where to go-India or China. (Alex has 36,ooo men to take out! Where in the hell have they all been?)
Imminent danger of disintegration and collapse. I hope the 22nd [Division] stands up. We are sending 40 people [Americans] to Myitkyina, 12 to Katha, and leaving 20 here. Dorn and I and Tseng and Belden to Loiwing, May 1, a.m.
Lo over, and obviously averse to the plane. Wants to ooze out of Myitkyina, leaving the baby with Tu. Finally told him O.K. he could go to Katha if the plane didn’t come, and I’d stay over. Loilem taken by 200th, which moved on north.
他们今晚将炸掉大桥[指位于曼德勒南面的阿瓦铁路大桥]。昨晚有消息说腊戍已经失守。（蒋介石曾打电报说我们要坚守曼德勒！！今天上午他又打电报说我们不必死守曼德勒。）亚历山大和温特顿来访。亚历山大的好运气到了头儿。现在看来日本人似乎是要冲向八莫。打电报要飞机回腊戍前线。罗由于这种或那种原因想乘火车。他手下的人将乘火车，但是他和我将乘飞机。我们一伙人直奔密支那。请示陆军部去什么地方——印度还是中国？（亚历山大要把3.6万人带出去！他们这些人究竟都在什么地方？）
分裂和崩溃的危险已经迫近。我希望22师能够顶住。我们将派40人去密支那，12人去杰沙，20人[这些人均是史迪威指挥部里的美国人]留在这里。5月1日上午，多恩、我、曾和贝尔登将去莱温。
罗卓英很不愿意乘飞机。他想偷偷地溜出密支那，把难做的事留给杜聿明去做。最后告诉他，可以，如果飞机不来的话，他可以去杰沙，我将留下来过夜。200师占领了莱林，它正在向北面调动。
5月3日
Off at 6: 30. Sibert and I and [Paul] Jones by rail- road auto. Nice ride to Karolin. Road blocked by two cars. Limey was just looking at them. Jones rooted them out and pushed the cars up. Did the Limey push? No. (No news from anywhere. Japs may be in Bhamo for all we know.) Got to Wuntho at 9: 30. Lo’s train is in.
Letter from Chiang K’ai-shek to go to Myitkyina with Fifth Army and not lose time. Rain. 22nd coming over the river. It is now apparent that we can no longer be of much use. Tu is doing just as [he] pleases. Lo has no control over him. Lin Hsiang is doing nothing. Why keep Americans in hot water?
Went at 8: 00 to see Lo. House dark-everybody gone. Went to train and talked supply. Lin Hsiang had no plan. I told him we had several. Should we work or not? Oh, of course. We are just bothering them now. “Fifth Army will bring their own food,”etc. etc. Lo wants a plane at Myitkyina. Lo was leaving without notice. No news. Three gar- bled wires from Chiang K’ai-shek. Decided to send our crowd out.
6点30分出发。赛伯特、我和（保罗）琼斯坐的是铁道车。很顺利地到达卡罗林。路被两辆汽车堵住了。那个英国人只是在一边看着。琼斯把汽车推到一边。那个英国人推了吗？没有。（没有接到任何一个地方的消息。据我们所能了解到的情况，日本人可能已到了八莫。）9点30分到达文多。罗卓英的火车也到达了。
蒋介石来信，要我们随同第五军去密支那，不要延误时间。下雨。22师过了河。现在情况已经很明显，我们已不可能再发挥多大的作用。杜聿明在为所欲为地行事。罗卓英控制不了他。林湘①（音译）什么事也不做。为什么要让美国人陷于困境呢？
8点钟去见罗卓英。屋里很暗——所有的人都走了。去火车那里，谈了供给问题。林湘没有计划。我告诉他我们有几个计划。我们应该工作还是不工作？噢，当然要工作。我们现在正在给他们添麻频。“第五军将自带食品”，等等，等等。罗卓英要求往密支那派一架飞机，但他通知后便离去了。没有消息。蒋介石的3封被断章取义的电报。决定把我们的人送出去。
①校对语：此处林湘可能应为林蔚拼写错误。
6月15日
Talk with Chiang K’ai-shek about this and that. Fifth Army to stay in India. I to retain command, because that will make it easy for the Chinese; they won’t have to deal with British. Tu [Yü-ming] to remain. (His face is to be saved, the hell with mine.)
He greeted with derisive laughter [the suggestion] that the Limeys might come back into Burma, grab Siam and Saigon. “Why, “he laughed merrily, “they can’t think of such a thing without the help of the Chinese Army.”(Jesus Christ.)They have the same old complex-planes, tanks, guns, etc., will win the war. I got a bit hot and told him that the only way to do it was to thoroughly reorganize the ground forces. Madame jumped up and came over and sat by me and said the G-mo had to consider “certain influences,”etc. I told her I, of course, understood all that. But with the U.S. on his side and backing him, the stupid little ass fails to grasp the big opportunity of his life.
与蒋介石谈各种问题。第5军将留在印度。我保留指挥权，因为这样做对中国人便利一些，他们用不着和英国人打交道。杜聿明将留任。（他保住了面子，我却丢了脸。）
他对英国人可能会打回缅甸，抢占暹罗和西贡的说法报以嘲弄的笑声。“什么？”他轻松地笑道，“没有中国军队的支援，他们想都不敢想”。（主啊）他们还是老一套心理——飞机、坦克、步枪等等就能够赢得战争胜利。我有点激动，告诉他赢得战争胜利的唯一出路是彻底重新整顿地面部队。蒋夫人跳起来，走过来坐在我旁边，说大元帅还要考虑到“某些影响”等等。我告诉她，对此我心里当然有数。但他认为站在他一边并支持他的美国所干出的小蠢事会使他失去一生中重大的机遇。
1943年日记节选
6月19日给史迪威夫人的信
You must be laughing about today’s news that Wavell is to be pushed upstairs and the Auk [General Sir Claude Auchinleck] replace him.If they give the Auk a free hand and real authority, things will look up.
Now the 22nd. What stopped me I don’t remember. We are in the doldrums waiting for a peanut “brain “to function. “The mountain labored and brought forth a mouse,” but this product will probably be a skunk. It’s hell to be plumped back into this cesspool after having had a breath of fresh air. There is no change in the high command and the wrestling match continues. I’ve got to pin a medal on Chiang and it will make me want to throw up.
你对今天的新闻一定会高兴的，韦维尔即将高升，接替他的是奥克。如果他们不对奥克进行干涉，而是给他真正的权力，情况将会好转起来。
现在是第22师。我记不得是什么阻拦住了我。我们意气消沉等着“花生米”的“脑子”转起来。“大山生出3个小老鼠”，但这个产物也许是个可恶的家伙。在吸了一口新鲜空气之后又扑通一声落进污水池里，真令人痛苦不堪。高级指挥机构内没有变化，摔跤比赛仍在继续。我不得不把一枚奖章别在蒋介石的身上，这令我十分作呕。
[未注明日期]拖延的例子，等等，等等。
- 3oth Division: Promised positively in Kunming by May 20. Postponed to June. Postponed to July. On July 12, only 1, 200 men had left [for Kunming].
- The 200 men promised for the 155s [at Ramgarh]. All but 65 rejected by Chinese doctors; 30 more by U.S. doctors; 35 went to India.
- 4, 5oo replacements for 22nd and 38th [Divisions in India]. Promised early in spring. By March. Not one has appeared up to July 12.
- Replacements for Y force. 132,000 started, months late, and 70000 diverted to Hupeh.
- Units of Y force. All to be in position by March 1 at latest. Not in yet.
- Heavy trench mortars for west front .. 23 promised with probability of 21 more. Now .. July 12… none on west front.
- Labor regiments to report in June. Now .. July 12 .. no sign of them.
- For airfields $500000,000 or a billion [Chinese dollars]. O.K. For the Burma Road after months of struggle $8 million, where $zoo million is needed.
- Animals. Refused to buy them when we asked because too expensive. One mule, [then] 12,000 [Chinese dollars]. Now .. July .. the price is 40,ooo. Solution is to buy smaller number with same amount.
- Attempts to steal payroll at Ramgarh. The”lump sum” stunt. Constant agitation. Lo Cho-ying got away with 100000 rupees a month. Split in Chung- king of course; he’s now in War Ministry.
- War Ministry interference in command and organization at Ramgarh. Constant fight.
- 第30师：明确许诺于5月20日抵达昆明。推到6月。推到7月。7月12日，只有1200人出发。
- 答应由200人中选派155人。大约65人被中国医生剔除；95名被美国医生剔除。去印度的只有35人。
- 给第22师和第38师4500名补充人员。答应初春到达。到3月。至7月12日尚无一人露面。
- 远征军的补充人员。开始答应13.2万人，迟到数月，而且7万人转到了湖北。
- 远征军各部。应最迟于3月1日全部就位。至今尚未完成。
- 供西线使用的重型迫击炮··答应23门，可能再多21门。如今···7月12日··一门没有。
- 几个劳动团应于6月报到。如今···7月12日··没见到他们的影子
- 机场需要5亿美元或10亿。经过数月争取，为缅甸公路要了800万美元，而实际需要是2亿。
- 牲畜。当我们提出购买它们时遭到拒绝，因为价钱太贵。一头骡子1.2万。现今···7月··价格是4万。解决的办法是用同样多的钱买少得多的头数。
- 在拉姆加尔试图偷窃领饷名单。“整块”手段①。不停地煽动。罗卓英离开时每月拿10万卢比。在重庆当然有派系不和；他现在在军政部。
- 军政部干涉拉姆加尔的指挥和组织。不断地争斗。 ①美军坚持要对拉姆加尔的士兵逐个付饷，进行当众点名。中国人则坚持士兵的饷金应“整块”交给各部队的指挥官。这是中国军队中传统的偷窃方法。美军对此予以拒绝。
1944年
3月4日
Sequence of messages: 8: 00 p.m. last night, Mer- rill arrives, jubilation; 10: 00 p.m. Brown’s first message-“enemy trap “and “heavy casualties,” gloom; at midnight, Brown’s garbled message repeated and received at 9: 00 a.m. “Will attack Ngam Ga at dawn. “Brown’s 5: 00 a.m. message received at 7: 00 a.m.: “Do not need battalion, want air to keep artillery down.” Told Brown to contact Merrill and get under his command.
Sixty-sixth Regiment] cut road south of Maingkwan, am- bushed Japs, claim 100, maybe 25. Japs using engineers, artillery and cooks as infantry. Entire [Jap] 56th [Division] is here all right and artillery too. Now if Merrill can do his stuff!! 3: 00 p. m. Chinese reported in Maingkwan.
5: 45: Frank Merrill is in Walawbum. One [American] killed, seven wounded. Says Japs lost at least 25 times that much.
一连串来电：昨晚8点，梅里尔到达，欣喜；晚10点，布朗头一次来电——“陷入敌人圈套”，“受到重大伤亡”，沮丧；半夜，布朗再次来电重复报告这一消息，早晨9点收到电讯“将于拂晓时分进攻宁加姆加”。上午7点收到布朗5点发出的消息：
“不需要部队支援，需要空军把炮火压下去。”要布朗同梅里尔联系并服从他的指挥。
66切断孟关以南道路，伏击日军。声称打死100人，也许只有25人。日本人将工程人员、炮兵和厨师用作步兵。整个第56都在这里，炮兵也在。现在只希望梅里尔能把他的事干好！！下午3点，中国人报告说进入了孟关。[本段中的66指中国66团；第56指日本第56师团。]
5点45分，弗兰克·梅里尔进入瓦拉盆。一人死亡，7人受伤。他说日本人的损失至少是其25倍。
3月6日
To Taipha at 2: 15. Louis [Mountbatten] in at 2: 45. Sixteen fighters escorted him. (We had four fighters working on the battle.) Went to headquarters and he made a dumb speech. Then we talked till 4: 45. Usual attempt to get me to commit myself. Back to 22nd Division command post at dark. Chow. Talk.
Japanese messages intercepted: “… casualties very large, we cannot protect river crossings … every man in the next few days must fight hard. Enemy is very strong and we must destroy him at all costs … cannot hold much longer if help does not come. no help available, fight to the end.”
2点15到太白。路易斯[蒙巴顿]2点45分到。16架战斗机护航。（我们用于战斗的才4架。）去司令部，他做了一番毫无价值的讲话。然后我们谈到4点45分。同往常一样企图使我就范。傍晚时分回到第22师指挥所。中国式食物。谈话。
破译日本人的电文：“……伤亡惨重，我们无法保住河流上的各渡口··……在接下来的几天里每个人都必须拼命战斗。敌人十分强大，我们必须不惜任何代价摧毁他··如果支援上不来就不可能再坚持下去··没有支援也要战斗到底。”
3月9日
Liao [commander 22nd Division] feeling his oats. (“2znd Division beat the best division of Jap Army at Kun Lun Kuan. Now it has beaten the second best division of the Jap Army.” The 1942 interlude [Burma retreat] is forgotten.)
廖[指22师师长廖耀湘]兴高采烈。（“第22师在昆仑关打败了日军中最厉害的师团。现在它又打败了日军中第二厉害的师团。”1942年的插曲[指缅甸撤退]却被他忘了。）
3月15日
More rain in night, thunderstorms. Wired Dorn to needle Wei.
Sixty-sixth [Regiment] now attacking at Jambu Bum. Item: It pays to go up and push. At least, it’s coincidence that every time I do, they spurt a bit.
夜里下了更多的雨，暴风雨。电告多恩去刺激卫立煌。
66[指66团]正在进攻坚布山。有一条经验：前去推动总有效果。至少构成巧合的是，每次我推动一下他们就冲刺一下。
3月19日
Sixty-one today. Well, we got Jambu Bum on my birthday anyway.
今天61岁。不管怎么说，我们在生日这天拿下了坚布山。
3月31日
We are below Shaduzup. Sixty-fifth [Regiment] attacking Laban against light opposition.
Radio to Louis [Mountbatten] for date. Situation at Imphal worse than ever. Sixty-fifth got into Laban at 6: 00.
我们到了沙杜祖下边。65[指65团]进攻拉班没遭到太多抵抗。给路易斯[蒙巴顿]发去电报约定时间。英帕尔的形势比以前更糟了。65团于6点进入拉班。
4月4日
Sweated out and decided to bring 114th [Regiment] up, keep 6sth [Regiment] in, and go on. Put rest of 112th [Regiment] in at Janpan-and if, as, and when go for Myitkyina. Meanwhile push south and hope for best at Dinapur [in Imphal area].
使出吃奶的劲在干。决定把114调上来，65继续前进。将余下的112[这里的数字是军队团的代号。即：114代表114团。下同]留在詹潘一一还有进攻密支那的条件、时间。同时向南推进，希望迪纳普尔的形势会好起来。
4月6日
Cloudy day. Kachins predict early monsoons. At noon, moved up to Shaduzup, camp not ready. Walked down to river and back to command post-full of Jap dug- outs and bashas and crap.
At 6: oo went to 22nd Division command post for conference. Back and forth, pro and con. Told them this [the Myitkyina-Kamaing drive] was our chance-our only chance. And we would all have to make a big effort. Division commanders push columns and break through this crust. “Speed to Kamaing. “Let Sun [Li-jen] have 112tb [Regiment]. Brown lent thirty trucks. 114th [Regiment] to march. We concentrate on Kamaing and Sun promises to go to Myitkyina, rain or no rain. Called on us to witness. (Now to keep pressure on.)
阴天。克钦人预言雨季将提前到来！恼。中午，到沙杜祖。营地尚未建好。走到河边，再回到指挥部——全是日本人挖的壕沟和丢下的破东西。
6点去22师指挥部开会。翻来复去地说，争论。告诉他们这是我们的机会[指对密支那——加迈的攻击]——我们唯一的机会。我们所有人都要努力。师指挥官们各自推动几支纵队行动起来。“加速开往加迈。”让孙立人和112[团]在一起。布朗支援了30辆卡车。114[团]行军前进。我们在加迈集结，孙保证不管下不下雨都去密支那。要求我们等着看。（现在继续保持压力。)
4月11日
Took Sun [Li-jen] down to see Fu [a subordi- nate regimental commander]. [Fu] still not in Wakawng. About half the [Jap] position taken. Jap orders say to hold to the last. Jap wounded found killed by cuts in neck and belly. Some Japs hung themselves in the dugouts. Seventy corpses claimed counted.
Back through heavy traffic. Met tank company going to Wakawng. They went in 1,000 yards ahead [of the] ist Battalion of the 66th [Regiment] and had two tanks knocked out.
带孙立人去见傅①[一名团长]。[傅团长]仍未到瓦拱。大概有一半[日本人]阵地已被占领。日本人命令坚持到底。发现日本伤兵抹脖子和剖腹自杀。日本人在壕沟中自杀。据统计有70具尸体。
从拥挤的路上回来。碰到坦克连开往瓦拱。它们行进在66[团]1[营]前面1000码，坏了2辆坦克。
①校对语：此处傅团长推测应为新22师65团团长傅宗良
4月17日
Talked to Merill about Mitch [Myitkyina] plan. Hit Mitch, May 12. God grant it doesn’t rain.
Lunch, then the avalanche. Fenn in …Godfrey, Davis in.. Asensio in. Sent for Pick. He came in and we went to it. Limeys wanted Pick to pay for trees cut down in making Ledo Road. Tie that. Session with Liao [commander of 22nd Division]. He says G-mo has not interfered with operations, but frequently writes to him. Has told him to obey me, even if I’m wrong. Pick here for supper. Kept him over- night, so he could sleep.
同梅里尔谈密支那进攻方案。5月12日进攻密支那。愿上帝保佑不要下雨。
午饭后，接连不断地来人。芬恩来了···戈弗雷、戴维斯来了···阿森西奥来了。派人去叫皮克。他来了，我们讨论了一下。英国人要皮克为在修筑利多公路时伐的树支付赔偿金。不理睬它。同廖耀湘开会。他说大元帅没有干预行动，但经常同他联系。大元帅要他服从我的命令，即使我是错的。皮克在这里吃晚饭。留他过夜，这样他可以睡上一觉。
5月2日
Another cloudy day. We sat and gloomed. The 22nd Division has had 57 company officers killed. Can’t push the 22nd Division under the circumstances and can’t help them. It’s hell. Joe up for supper and checkers. Christ but I feel helpless.
又是阴天。我们沮丧地枯坐。22师已有57名连级军官战死。在这种情况下不能命令22师推进了，也无法去援救他们。天啊。乔来吃晚饭，下了会儿跳棋。我觉得没有什么办法了。
5月4日
Louis’s latest is proposal to withdraw [our] force so as to save planes, presumably to use in Imphal. Back at 3: 00. Liao is now making all the known excuses for not moving. He and Sun have been hobnobbing for three days. He’s going to lie down and dig in.
路易斯[蒙巴顿]的最新建议是撤回力量以省下飞机，大概是用于英帕尔。3点回来。现在廖耀湘正在找出一切已知的借口，以便不再前进。他和孙立人谈了3天。他要躺倒不干了。
5月5日
Liao in at 1: 30. Long talk. He is affected by losses, particularly company officers.
1点30分，廖耀湘来了。长谈。损失使他受到很大影响，尤其是连级军官的损失。
6月4日
Kuo, [of] 38th [Division], in to announce capture of Tumboughka. That’s grand. And Liao has told Fu to get into Kamaing tomorrow. Chiang K’ai-shek says: “Come up for Christ’s sake, “so shoved off at 4: 00. Kunming at 7: 00.
38[师]的郭来报告，占领了坦布卡。太好了。廖对傅说明天进攻加迈。蒋介石说：“看在主的份上，快来。”于是4点匆忙动身，7点到昆明。
6月16日
Good news at last. 22nd in Kamaing and having a hell of a time. Before noon. That should have been a killing.
终于有了好消息。22师进入加迈，一场苦战。午前。这肯定是一个大收获。