史迪威日记（节选其中与第五军、新二二师相关部分）
回到目录页作者：史迪威
录入校对：观棋不语
本书的内容和编排体例是：
- 每章开始或每章中间以楷体字呈现的是抗战期间美国驻中国战地记者白修德所写的背景介绍。（校对语：在整合版中以中英文斜体出现）
- 史迪威的日记和他的评论性文字，以及他与史迪威夫人的通信。
- 由编译者所加的人物、事件简介，在相对应的正文中以卡片的形式呈现。
- 本书在初版时，由白修德担任编辑者，并由他撰写了背景介绍和前言，本书正文中的脚注也出自白修德之手。
- 本书正文中（）中的内容为史迪威日记、评论、书信中原有；[]中的内容为编译者所加。
3月10日
Talk with Chiang K’ai-shek. Lecture about Chinese temperament and limitations. Why they can’t attack. What they will do. Won’t retreat until ordered out, etc., etc. But defeat in Burma would be disastrous shock to morale. Fifth and Sixth [are] “cream of Army.” Must be careful, etc., etc. I put up a stout plea to use the British as far as possible, and not expose Chiang K’ai-shek to criticism by reneging on his commitments. He had a lot of good sense in his talk. Importance of making good-first foreigner to handle Chinese troops. Impression made on these troops will make or break me. Must look to future. I repeated instructions and went over all the points he had made. Look at it coldly, and the Chinese are doing a big thing from their point of view in handing over this force to a lao mao-tzu [old hat] they don’t know very well. It must be a wrench for them, and they should be given due credit, in spite of all the restrictions they have put on me. 22nd and 96th Divisions (of Fifth Army) edge in when chow is provided. Sixth Army stays put. Hold Toungoo- Prome line till British leave Prone. Then back to T’hazi line. Hold at Thazi and concentrate for counterattack.
同蒋介石谈话。蒋大谈中国人的气质和他们所受到的约束；他们不能进攻的理由；他们想要做什么；除非接到撤出的命令，否则他们不会这样做，等等，等等。但是在缅甸的失败对于士气将是灾难性的一击。第五军和第六军是“军队中的精华”。必须慎重，等等，等等。我态度异常坚决地请求尽可能地利用英国人。他在谈话中判断敏锐。他知道这次行动的成败事关重大——一个外国人第一次指挥中国军队。给这些军队留下的印象将使我或是成功，或是毁灭。必须面向未来。我把他说的要点都重复了一遍。用客观的观点来看这件事，中国人把军队交给一个他们并不十分熟悉的外国人，是做了一件了不起的大事。这对他们来说肯定是十分痛苦的，尽管他们对我进行种种限制，但他们应当得到本应得到的称赞。
得到食品供应后，（第五军的）第22师和第96师缓慢地开了进去。第六军留在原地未动。在英国人离开眉谬之前要一直据守东吁一眉谬一线。然后回到达西一线。守住达西，集结力量准备反攻。
When Stilwell arrived in Burma to assume combat duties in March he found a country whose civil population, both rear and front, festered with discontent and treachery. The strategy of the entire Burma campaign spun itself about the north-south railway line that ran three hundred miles from Rangoon to Mandalay, and then in meter gauge, two hundred fifty miles more to Myitkyina. Some- where in central Burma the Allies hoped to establish a front cutting from east to west across the railway, where the Japanese might be held. Meanwhile the actual line of combat was some hundred miles north of Rangoon, running east and west for roughly one hundred miles. This front was being pushed north by the Japanese, but the Allies were trying to shield the railway as they withdrew to keep retreat from degenerating into a rout over pathless mountains and jungles. The western end of the front (nearest India) was held by the British at Prome. The center, at Toungoo directly on the railway, was held by the Chinese 200th Division, the eastern end (nearest Thailand) was held by the British again. The forces at Stilwell’s command consisted of the following:
- Chinese Fifth Army (Commander: Tu Yü-ming) which in turn commanded the 200th Division(Tai), 22nd Division (Liao), goth Division (Yu), and the 38th Division(Sun)
- Chinese Sixth Army (Commander: Kan Li-ch’u) which in turn commanded the 55th Division(Chen), 28th Division (?) and the 49th Division (?)
The 200th Division was in the line. The rest of the Fifth Army was in north Burma several hundred miles to the rear. The Sixth Army was disposed along the border of China and Thailand. The Japanese in their swift drive north had almost encircled the 200th division (Chinese) at Toungoo in the center. But in so doing they had also exposed themselves, and Stilwell saw an opportunity for a counterattack. As commander in chief of the Burma Expeditionary Forces of the Chinese Armies he wanted to concentrate his forces at Pyinmana on the railway 60 miles north of the front. He wanted particularly to bring down the 22nd and g6th Divisions of General Tu Yü-ming’s Fifth Army from the north, where they were useless, to the Pyinmana area, where they could rescue the 200th Division. Scattered across Burma, the Chinese divisions would be destroyed one by one-concentrated and used in battle, they might check the Japanese advance. It might even be possible to recapture Rangoon and reopen the port. The plan depended on two things: the ability of the British to hold the western flank at Prome and the swiftness and diligence of the Chinese in moving to execute orders for a counterattack. To the Chinese, however, concentration of divisions in the battle zone for a counterattack meant not a multiplication of opportunity, but a multiplication of risk of loss. Reluctance to attack seemed to drench the spirit of the Chinese command beyond any measure of encouragement Stilwell could give. In the course of the next two weeks Stilwell found that his authority to command was an authority of courtesy, not an authority of action. He decided then to fly back to Chungking and discuss the matter with Chiang K’ai- shek.
白修德注：
3月，当史迪威到达缅甸，承担起指挥作战的职责时，他发现这个国家无论是在后方还是前方，由于普通老百姓的不满和背叛，状况变得越来越糟。 整个缅甸战役是围绕着贯穿缅甸南北的铁路线进行的。这条铁路线从仰光至曼德勒，有300英里长，此后是1米的窄轨，再走250英里到达密支那。盟军希望在缅甸中部的某个地方建立一条战线，从东向西横跨铁路线摆开，以此阻止住日军。当时实际的战线在仰光以北大约100英里处，从东到西宽约100英里。这条战线正在被日军推向北面，但盟军在撤退时力图保住铁路，以免在撤退时穿越无路可走的山地和丛林。 战线的西端（离印度最近的地方）由驻眉谬的英军据守。战线中部的东吁在铁路线上，由中国的第200师扼守，东端（离泰国最近的地方）也是由英军防守。 归史迪威指挥的部队如下：
- 中国的第五军（指挥官：杜聿明），该军下辖第200师（戴）、第22师（廖）、第96师（余）和第38师（孙）。
- 中国的第六军（指挥官：甘丽初），该军下辖第55师（陈）、第28师（？）和第49师（？）。
第200师正在前线，第五军的其余部队在缅甸北部，距后方几百英里。第六军被部署在中国和泰国的边境线上。 日本人迅速地向北推进，几乎包围了战线中部东吁的第200师。但日本人在向前推进时也暴露了他们自己，史迪威看到了一个反攻的机会。作为中国缅甸远征军总司令，他要求把部队在战线以北60英里铁路线上的彬马那集结起来。他特别要求杜聿明将军的第22师和第96师从北部挥师南下，开到彬马那地区，去解救第200师。中国的各个师如果分散在缅句各地，就会被各个击破；但如果他们集结起来投入战斗，就有可能阻挡住日本人的进攻，甚至可能重新夺取仰光。 这个计划有赖于两点：英国人在眉谬能够守住战线的西翼，中国人能够迅速完全地执行反攻命令。 然而，对于中国人来说，把各个师集结在作战地区进行反攻在增加了机会的同时也增加了危险。看来，无论史迪威用什么方法加以鼓励，中国的指挥机构也不愿意去进攻。在以后的两周里，史迪威发现，他的指挥权只是表面的权力，而不是实际上的权力。于是他决定飞回重庆，去同蒋介石讨论这个问题。
3月13日
Friday the 13th. Alexander arrived. Very cautious. Long sharp nose. Rather brusque and yang ch’i [standoffish]. Let me stand around while waiting for Shang Chen to come. Uninterested when Shang did come. Astonished to find ME-mere me, a goddam American-in command of Chinese troops. “Extraordinary!” Looked me over as if I had just crawled out from under a rock.
2: 00 p.m. Brigadier Clark and Colonel Jones about maintenance. They agreed to do it. Also will repair ordnance and operating instruments. Damn nice of them. In fact, all the British are now co-operating. If Chiang K’ai-shek will only say “Go” we’re off. The press is after me now. Dorn is keeping them off.
About midnight, Major Miller, from the governor’s office, barged into my bedroom, woke me up and said General Morris was in from India, and that he and General Alexander wanted to see me at 10: 00 in the morning at “Flagstaff House.” Can you beat it? I wonder what those babies would have said if I had sent Dorn on a similar errand to them? It’s just the superior race complex, for which they will pay dearly. The situation down front looked bad, so I radioed Chiang K’ai-shek over Hou’s secret set, to release the 22nd and g6th Divisions to go to Pyinmana and back up the 200th.
13日，星期五。亚历山大¹ 抵达。既谨小慎微，又极其鲁莽、冷漠。在等待商震的时候居然让我一个人站在那里。在商震来时无动于衷。商震惊奇地发现居然是我在指挥中国军队，一个该死的美国人。“妙极了！”他上下打量着我，好像我是刚刚从石头下面爬出来似的。
下午2点钟，与克拉克准将[时任美国陆军地面部队司令部代参谋长]和琼斯上校讨论军械保养问题。他们同意去做修理军械和操作设备的事情。这些东西的情况糟透了。事实上，现在所有的中国人都很合作。只要蒋介石说一声“走”，我们就完事大吉了。现在新闻界已经盯上我了。多恩正在设法让我避开他们。
大约在午夜时分，总督办公处的米勒少校闯进我的卧室，把我叫醒，说莫里斯将军已从印度来到这里，他和亚历山大将军想在上午10点钟同我在旗杆别墅见面。我想知道如果我派多恩到他们那里去干同样的事情，他们会说些什么？这完全是一种高人一等的变态心理，他们将为此付出高昂的代价。
前线的情况看来不妙，于是我通过侯的秘密电台给蒋介石拍了封电报，要求他允许22师和96师去彬马那增援200师。
¹ 哈罗德·亚历山大爵士，陆军元帅，后来成为地中海所有盟国部队的司令官。
3月15日（上午9点）
Morris, Hutton, Alexander, at Flagstaff House. Told them the news. They were much relieved. Alexander now pleasanter. (Morris has talked to him.) They had the instructions out studying them. Alexander tried to joke about my stealing his Chinese troops. [He] wanted to wear some Chinese insignia. Sent word to Wavell and Brereton…. Asked for air support.
Alex says he has just 4,000 fighting men. Alex says he now perfectly understands and we will co-operate alongside each other.
Move of 22nd and g6th Divisions under way. Leading elements here tomorrow. Tu came over at 5: 00. He had to shoot a man of the 55th Division at Lashio for hell-raising. I told him to keep it up. DC-3 crash at Kunming. General Dennys killed, on way to tell Chiang K’ai-shek to send more troops.
Got Tu over, went over plan, wrote order for Tu.
与莫里斯、赫顿和亚历山大在旗杆别墅。把这个消息告诉了他们。他们大大地松了一口气。亚历山大的举止现在令人轻松愉快。他们仔细地研究了那些命令。亚历山大想开个玩笑，说我偷走了他的中国军队。他想佩戴一些中国军队的标志。通知了韦维尔和布里尔顿··要求空中支援。
亚历山大说他仅有4000名战斗人员。并说他现在已完全释怀，我们将肩并肩地进行合作。
22师和96师已开始行动。先头部队将于明天到达这里。杜5点钟来访。他在腊戍枪毙了55师中一个胡作非为的人。我告诉他要保持振作。DC—3型飞机在昆明失事，丹尼斯将军遇难，他此行是想让蒋介石增派军队。
帮助杜恢复了常态，仔细检查了计划，写了给杜的命令。
3月19日
Had a night’s sleep-first time since Calcutta. Woke up without feeling all was lost. At 11:00 saw Chiang K’ai-shek again. Stubborn bugger. But he gave in a bit. 22nd Division can go to Taungdwingyi and can support 200th or help British out of a mess if they lose Prome. [See map, page 57.] Under my command only, and only in emergency. It’s to be morale mainly.
g6th Division must stay in Mandalay, but one division of Sixth Army will be sent to Maymyo. Later two more will go to border. In a month, if nothing happens, maybe we can take the offensive. (He wants to be sure it will be easy.) Again told me Fifth and Sixth must not be defeated, so I told him to send someone who could guarantee that, because I couldn’t. In war, we’d have to do our best and take what came. He laughed. Said he had bowed in some part to my recommendations, but insisted he knew what he was talking about. Told him when fighting started, I would have to be free to act, and he agreed. Of course under the general restrictions of defensive attitude, one division in Mandalay, no British command, and help for British only in an emergency. It’s pretty bad, but maybe it will get better. All I can do is try.
59 today. Very nice message from Marshall.
Q. Am I getting anywhere?
A. Compared to two weeks ago, decidedly. Appointment as Chief of Staff,(Creation of)Joint Staff, and Commanding General of Fifth and Sixth Armies. Of course there are many restrictions, but not so many as at first. Continued butting is wearing down resistance. Repeated arguments are shaking Madame somewhat. (In fact she told me to keep it up.) And Ho Ying-ch’in, Pai Chung-hsi, Liu Fei, and Hsü Yung-ch’ang unanimously approved my argument. That might be considered a major victory. Even Chiang K’ai-shek has yielded on some points-he is sending more troops, he has released a division to Taungdwingyi, and I can even use it to help the British at Prome. He will consider an offensive if there is quiet, or a successful defense-after another month. The supply is arranged, the medical people are stirred up, and the British understand how they must work. The Chinese accept my status, which is close to a miracle, since it is the first time in modern history that a foreigner has commanded regular Chinese troops.
睡了整整一夜——自加尔各答以来的第一次。醒来时已没有那种失掉了一切的感觉。11点再次去见蒋介石。固执的家伙。但他稍微让了点步。22师可以开到东敦枝，去支援200师；或是在英国人失去眉谬时帮助他们摆脱困境。只能由我来指挥，而且只有在处于十分紧急的情况下。
96师必须留驻曼德勒，但第六军的一个师将被派往眉谬。此后另外两个师将被派到边境地区。如果不发生意外，也许在一个月里我们就能发动攻势。（他要确保能轻而易举地完成它。）他再次对我说，决不能让第五军和第六军吃败仗。于是我对他说，让他另外找一个能保证这一点的人来，因为我无法保证做到这一点。在战争中，我们必须竭尽自己的努力去干，并接受现实结果。他笑了。他说他同意我建议中的某些部分，但仍坚持他所谈论的事情。我告诉他，一旦战斗打响，我必须有行动的自由，他同意了。当然，我还要受到进攻上的一些限制，一个师在曼德勒，不允许英国人来指挥，只有在紧急情况下才能去帮助英国人。这糟透了。但情况也许会好转。我所能做的就是去试一试。
今天59岁了。马歇尔那里传来了非常好的消息。
问题：我的工作有成效吗？
回答：与两周前相比，已取得了决定性进展。被任命为参谋长，第五军和第六军建立了联合参谋部，以我为指挥官。当然，还有许多限制，但已不像刚开始时那么多了。不断的争论已使对手慢慢败退下来。反复申诉自己的观点也使夫人的立场有了松动。（事实上，她还让我坚持下去。）何应钦、白崇禧、刘斐和徐永昌一致赞同我的观点。这应当被视为是一场重大胜利。甚至连蒋介石也在某些问题上做了让步——他将派遣更多的军队，他同意派一个师去东敦枝，我甚至可以用这个师来帮助在眉谬的英国人。如果再过一个月，防守取得成功，他将考虑进攻的问题。供给已安排好了，医务人员已发动起来，英国人必须知道他们应如何工作。中国人接受了我的地位，这几乎是个奇迹，一个外国人指挥中国的正规军，这在近代历史上还是第一次。
3月23日
Toungoo being attacked. Tu [of Fifth Army] worried. Talked it over. Will send 22nd Division to Pyinmana and Yedashe and prepare to counterattack to support 200th.
- 55th Division hurry to Pyawbwe.
- 22nd Division hurry to Pyinmana and south.
- Radio Chiang K’ai-shek that Tu wants help near-by and I agree.
Rushed back to Maymyo to get things going. Arrived 4: 30. No air support left now. Tai’s tanks on way [to front], 30 miles south of Mandalay at 2: 30. Bed at 12: 00.
东吁受到攻击。杜聿明感到担忧。详细讨论此事。决定派22师去彬马那和耶达谢，准备反攻，以支援200师。
- 55师迅速赶往标贝。
- 22师迅速赶往彬马那及其南部。
- 致电蒋介石，杜聿明要求就近给予支援，我赞同。
立即赶回眉谬。4点30分到达。现在已没有空中支援。戴的坦克正在开往前线，2点30分到达曼德勒以南30英里处。12点睡觉。
3月24日
200th Division hang on [at Toungoo] till 22nd Division gets set at Pyinmana [to support it]. [22nd] can’t be sent to Taungdwingyi now, no water there anyway. Push out a regiment south, and then tell 200th Division to break out and join at Pyinmana. Put 55th Division in at Pyawbwe and hang on at Pyinmana. (Use g6th and 38th Divisions similarly and delay back to Mandalay. This is the best we can hope for.) Wrote letters. Haircut. Nap. Japs north of Toungoo.
The suspense till the 22nd [Division] gets going is bad.
战局：200师在[东吁]坚守，等待22师在彬马那部署完毕。
现在不能把22师派往东敦枝，那里没有水。让一个团向南推进，然后通知200师突围，在彬马那会合。（用同样的方式使用96师和38师，推迟回曼德勒。这是我们所能想到的最好的方案。）写信。理发。午睡。日本人已到达东吁北部。
在22师取得进展之前，这种悬而未决的局面很不妙。
3月25日
Situation confused. Got it straight with Tu. He is quite cheerful with 22nd [Division] coming down. General Scott, 1st Burmese Division, in. Looking for 4 guns and 200 men. Caught in surprise at Toungoo airfield yesterday.
Nap. Scott back. Got his guns. Tu has report [Chinese] counterattack has reached point just north of [Toungoo] airfield.
9:00 p.m. to see Tu-he had scheme of attack ready for the 27th. Exactly like my solution. Whole of 22nd Division will attack from Kyundon south. (If the Japs will stay put tomorrow.) Chiang K’ai-shek has changed his mind. Three [radio] letters on the 23rd. 3:00 p.m., 5:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. Full of all kinds of warnings, admonition, and caution. Then, at last, at 9: 00 p.m., he said, “Use your judgment and give ‘em hell.” Apparently the fight here has pepped him up. [He says] we can use the 22nd. (Which I had already ordered in.) And I told Tu to take the o6th and bring it along also. The 55th is already turned over to Tu. Whoops. WHAT A RELIEF.
Chiang K’ai-shek and his changeable mind had me worried. I was deadly afraid he would call off this attack. But the seed has apparently taken root, and as Tu says, now we can work my plan. Christ. The mental load on a commander who has strings tied to him. Now Chiang K’ai-shek is concerned about pursuit before we even stop the Japs. If I had done what he wanted and put the 22nd in Taungdwingyi, the 200th would have been Iost and God knows what might have happened. It may still be bad, but it couldn’t be that bad. Three newspaper boys [in for interviews.]
局势混乱。同杜聿明一同处理问题。他对22师的到来感到十分鼓舞。斯科特将军和缅甸第一师也来了。等待4门大炮和200名军人。昨天在东吁机场意外地相遇。
午睡。斯科特回来了。他找到了他的大炮。杜得到报告说反攻部队已到达机场北面。
晚上9点去见杜，他制订了27日进攻的计划。同我的方案极相似。整个22师将从均栋南部发动进攻。（如果日本人明天仍留在原地的话。）蒋介石改变了主意。他于23日午后3点、5点和9点接连发来3封电报。电报中充满了各种警告、劝说和告诫。他在晚上9点钟的那封电报中说，“运用你的判断力，让他们灵魂出窍。”显然，这里的战斗使他激动不已。[蒋介石说]我们可以动用22师（其实，我在这之前已经动用此师投入了战斗）。我让杜聿明去接管96师，把它也带过来。55师已被杜接管。啊，这多么令人欣慰！
令我感到担忧的是蒋介石和他的反复无常。我十分担心他会取消这次进攻。但是种子已经扎下了根，正如杜聿明所说的那样，我们现在可以实施我的计划了。天哪。一个受他操纵的指挥官要承受着多么巨大的精神负担啊。甚至在我们还没有阻挡住日本人的时候，蒋介石就已经在关心追击的事情了。如果我按照他的设想去做，把22师部署在东敦枝，200师就会被毁灭，只有上帝知道会发生什么事情。现在的情况可能还是不妙，但不会比那样做更糟糕。
未标注时间
[This undated paper, found in General Stilwell’s files, was probably written shortly after the close of the first Burma campaign.]
[下面这份未注明日期的文件是在史迪威将军的档案里发现的，也许是在第一次缅甸战役结束不久后写的。]
When Chiang K’ai-shek told me I was to take command of the Chinese Army in Burma I found that he expected to give me the benefit of his advice and experiences. At the time, the 200th Division was at Toungoo, and the 22nd going into Mandalay and the g6th near Lashio.
He asked me what my plan was and I told him I wanted to concentrate the three divisions near Toungoo. This was not the approved solution: Mandalay, he insisted, was the key to the situation, and he preferred to put both the 22nd and the g6th there, so as to have a strong garrison. We were told to hold Mandalay at all costs. I told him that this would mean that the 200th Division would be beaten and the Japs could then march to Mandalay unopposed. I wanted to fight as far forward as possible, after concentrating all available force there. If we could get three divisions concentrated, we would have some chance of holding the Japs, whereas leaving the 200th Division unsupported would mean losing it and having to oppose the Japs later with only the other two. No, that was not the way it would work. He would give me an instance in his own experience. He had just such a case at Chengchow, which the Japs were approaching from the east. There were three divisions available, but he was too crafty to put them all out there at once. He put one of then in Chengchow, with orders to defend to the last, and drew the other two back to the west about 5o miles. The Japs attacked and destroyed the division in Chengchow. But they went no farther. And do you know why? This, he announced, was a matter of psychology-the Japs were so impressed with the determined defense put up by one division that they simply did not have the heart to go and attack the other two. So really he had stopped the Jap attack with the sacrifice of only one-third of his force.
This dazzling victory left me cold: I told him the 200th Division was in a very exposed advanced position and should be supported; it was a good division and we could not afford to lose it; its morale would suffer if it were left to bear the brunt of the Jap attack. Chiang K’ai-shek said not to worry about that; I could feel free to order the division to stay and fight to the last man, and I should not be squeamish about it; there would be many times I would have to harden my heart and refuse to listen to calls for help. The thing to do was to let the 200th do the best they could, and hold on to Mandalay itself.
Actually, Mandalay had no military significance and offered no advantages as a position for defense. Chiang had never seen it, but apparently thought of it as a walled city and therefore a strong point. He drew a circle around it on the map and pointed to it dramatically saying, “There is the key to the defense of Burma. Never mind what hap- pens south of it: we must put a strong garrison in Mandalay and hold it.” Since we had already arranged with the British to attempt to hold the Prome-Toungoo line, I kept at him and asked for three more divisions to be sent down. These could make Mandalay safe, while we were fighting to the south. The other units were promised and I finally got permission to move the 22nd to support the 200th, but beyond this he would not go, and it was plain that he was making a concession against his better judgment.
Even after he, the G-mo, had shown me the key to the situation, I was insisting on a different plan and what did it amount to? In spite of his uneasiness, he was letting me move another division forward: this would reduce the garrison of Mandalay to one division, and when we were defeated at Toungoo, we would have lost two divisions instead of only one. In rebuttal, I ventured to say that if we had all three divisions at Toungoo, maybe we would beat the Japs, but this horrified him because it would leave Mandalay (200 miles in the rear) temporarily unoccupied. In this connection, there was an important thing he wanted me to remember, and that was that because of their deficiencies in armament, equipment and transport, it took three Chinese divisions to hold off one Jap division, and an attack on that basis was out of the question. Five Chinese divisions were necessary before an attack could have any hope of success. This was the doctrine that the Chinese Army was saturated with: with the G-mo giving such a lead, the fearful and the incompetent always had a good reason for retreat, and this fitted in with the natural desire of the Chinese commanders to keep their units at as great a strength as possible. The G-mo gave me further instructions in psychology and tactics, and told me if I would observe him and listen for only six months, I could myself learn something of both arts. I emerged from this conference with permission to move one division up behind the 200th in case I felt it desirable on my arrival at the front. Considering his feeling about the matter, this was a handsome concession to make. And in all fairness, it must have been a severe strain on him to put a foreigner in command of regular Chinese troops in action at all. It had never been done before, and he was trying it on short acquaintance with a man he knew little about. Even though, as I found out later, he had ways of effectively circumscribing the authority he apparently delegated without restrictions, the face of the Chinese high command was severely affected, and it put an extra burden on me in my efforts to gain their confidence. I left, feeling that maybe some real executive authority might be ultimately forthcoming, as agreed, in spite of the cockeyed conception of warfare I had been listening to: it was lucky.
当蒋介石告诉我，我将指挥缅甸的中国军队时，我发现他希望我能从他的劝告和经验中受益。当时，200师在东吁，22师即将进驻曼德勒，96师靠近腊戍。
他问我有什么计划，我告诉他我打算在东吁一带把这3个师集结起来，但这一方案未得到同意。他坚持认为，曼德勒是形势的关键所在，他希望把22师和96师部署在那里，以使那里有坚强的防御力量。我们被告知要不惜一切地坚守曼德勒。我告诉他，这将意味着200师被击败，日本人将没有阻碍地直扑曼德勒。我希望把所有的部队集中起来，在尽可能远的地方进行战斗。如果我们能集结起3个师，我们就有可能挡住日本人；而让200师孤立无援就意味着失去它，以后还不得不用仅有的两个师来对抗日本人。不，事情不会这样发展。他以他自己的经验给我举了个例子。他手边刚好有一个郑州的例子，日本人从东面向这个城市逼近。那里有3个师，但是他十分狡猾，没有把它们都部署在前线。
他把其中的一个师部署在郑州，命令它死守；把另外两个师撒到西面约50英里处。日本人进攻时消灭了郑州的那个师。但他们没能再向前推进。你知道为什么吗？他说道，这是由于心理上的原因——日本人对这个师的拼死抵抗留下了深刻印象，他们已不肯再去进攻另外两个师了。于是，他仅仅牺牲了1/3的部队，就阻止了日本人的进攻。
这种辉煌的胜利没有令我动心：我告诉他，200师处于极为凸出的暴露位置，应该得到增援；那是一个很优秀的师，我们不能失去它；如果让它去承受抵抗日军攻击的主要压力，那么它的士气将受到打击。蒋介石说没必要为此担心。我可以命令该师坚守并战斗至最后一兵一卒，不必为此不安，也不必神经过敏。我今后将要反复使自己心如铁石，不去理会要求给予帮助的呼吁。要做的事情就是让200师尽其一切力量，独自坚守。
实际上，曼德勒毫无军事意义，没有一个防御阵地的有利条件。蒋从未认识到这一点，但他显然是认为曼德勒有城墙环绕，因而是个有利的防御据点。他在地图上围着曼德勒画了个圈，指着它用夸张的口吻说，“这里是缅甸防御的关键。别管它的南边发生什么，我们必须在曼德勒部署坚固的防线，保住它。”由于我们已同英国人商定要尽力保住眉谬—东吁防线，因此我坚持要求他再派3个师来。这些师既可以保证曼德勒的安全，同时还可以在南方投入战斗。派遣其他部队得到了保证，我最后也被允许调动22师去支援200师，但除此之外，蒋再也不愿让步半分，显然，他做出的这一让步已违背了他的最佳判断。
甚至在这位大元帅向我讲明了局势的关键所在之后，我依然坚持一项不同的计划，但这有什么意义呢？尽管他十分勉强，但他还是同意我把另一个师调到前方：这将使曼德勒的守卫力量减少到一个师，当我们在东吁败战后，我们将失去两个师而不是仅仅失去一个师。我冒昧地对此进行反驳说，如果我们把3个师都调往东吁，也许我们能够打败日本人，但这个提议使他感到恐慌，因为这将使曼德勒（在东吁后面200英里处）处于暂时无人守卫的状态。接着，他要求我牢牢记住一个十分重要的事实，中国军队由于武器、装备和运输方面的缺陷，需要用3个师去抵挡日本的一个师，在这种基础上发动进攻是根本不可能的。至少要有5个师，进攻才有成功的希望。这就是中国军队一向奉行不违的信条：既然大元帅能带这个头，畏敌如虎者和无能之辈就总是能找到失实的理由向后撤退，这也符合中国指挥官尽可能保存其部队实力的本能愿望。大元帅还就心理和战术问题给我做了进一步的指示。他告诉我，如果我注意观察他的一言一行，只需6个月，我就能够对这两种艺术有所领悟。这次艰难的会议结束后我得到许诺，当我在前线感到有必要时，可以把一个师向前调到200师后面。考虑到他在这个问题上的感受，这已是一个相当大度的让步了。公平地说，对于他，能够让一个外国人在战斗中指挥中国的正规军，肯定是一次极严峻的考验。这种事以前从未有过，而他在试着这样做的时候，和我还刚刚相识，对我所知甚少。我后来发现，即使如此，他也有许多有效的方法来限制权力，但他当初授权时显然未做任何限制，中国最高指挥部的面貌因此而受到很大影响，它也给我争取他们信任的努力增加了额外的困难。我在离开时感到，尽管我听到的是关于战争的荒谬概念，但某种真正的行政权力可能最终将会出现，其他一些人也同意这一看法。幸运的是，我在当时并不知道需要进行多么长的艰苦卓绝的斗争。